Rallying Education Activism From The Grassroots Up: A Case Study of The South Carolina Education Improvement Act of 1984 by Huguley, Sally Saunders
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2016
Rallying Education Activism From The Grassroots
Up: A Case Study of The South Carolina Education
Improvement Act of 1984
Sally Saunders Huguley
University of South Carolina
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Educational Administration and Supervision Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Huguley, S. S.(2016). Rallying Education Activism From The Grassroots Up: A Case Study of The South Carolina Education Improvement
Act of 1984. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/3552
  
RALLYING EUDCATION ACTIVISM FROM THE GRASSROOTS UP: 
A CASE STUDY OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA EDUCATION 
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1984 
 
by 
 
Sally Saunders Huguley 
 
Bachelor of Arts 
Duke University, 1972 
 
Master of Arts 
University of Georgia, 1981 
 
Master of Arts in Teaching 
University of South Carolina, 1993 
 
 
 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
 
Educational Administration 
 
College of Education 
 
University of South Carolina 
 
2016 
 
Accepted by: 
 
Doyle Stevick, Major Professor 
 
Peter Moyi, Committee Member 
 
Diane Monrad, Committee Member 
 
Ashlee Lewis, Committee Member 
 
Lacy Ford, Senior Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies
ii 
© Copyright by Sally Saunders Huguley, 2016 
All Rights Reserved.
iii 
DEDICATION 
For the public school students and teachers of South Carolina. 
You deserve better. 
  
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Thanks are due to many for their assistance in the completion of this dissertation. 
First, to those who gave their time for interviews. These include former U.S. Secretary of 
Education and S.C. Governor Dick Riley for his state and national leadership on behalf of 
America’s public school children. To interview participants Dr. Larry Winecoff and Dr. 
Conrad Powell for their insights and documents on citizen participation; Vivian Watson, 
Joe Grant, and Elizabeth Gressette for descriptions of teacher interactions; Charleston 
attorney Bill Youngblood’s recollections of dealings with the business community, and 
former S.C. Sen. Harry Chapman’s legislative war stories. 
Special appreciation goes to Bill Prince, Riley’s gubernatorial political director, 
for his frank and perceptive discussion of what it took to pass the EIA. 
In particular, great thanks to Dr. Terry Peterson, Riley’s education advisor while 
governor and Secretary of Education. Access to Terry’s private collection of EIA internal 
documents, reports, books, and other EIA communications provided valuable insight, as 
did his multiple interviews.  
To the good people at the S.C. Department of Archives and History, who pulled 
boxes of documents from the Riley administration collection.  
Also, many thanks to my dissertation committee: Dr. Doyle Stevick for 
suggesting this case study; Dr. Diane Monrad, patron and fellow Blue Devil, for her 
unfailing good advice; Dr. Peter Moyi for his help in overcoming many doctoral hurdles, 
and Dr. Ashlee Lewis, who was never too busy to share thoughtful suggestions.
v 
ABSTRACT 
 With the 1983 publication of A Nation At Risk that warned of the “rising tide of 
mediocrity” in American public education, southern governors took the lead in proposing 
reforms to their states’ lagging education systems. Among those was South Carolina 
Governor Richard W. Riley, who proposed public school reform legislation funded by a 
statewide one cent sales tax increase within the difficult context of a legislative election 
year. Facing stiff opposition to the tax increase from the South Carolina General 
Assembly, Riley launched a statewide grassroots effort to pressure the Legislature to 
enact the 1984 Education Improvement Act (EIA) and the dedicated tax increase to fund 
it. As the result of sustained citizen engagement, the state General Assembly approved 
the EIA and its sales tax increase intact. There are scholarly articles and dissertations 
detailing how other southern governors championed school reform in their respective 
states in the wake of A Nation At Risk. However, none focused on South Carolina’s 
unique “grass tops/grassroots” plan to build a network of education supporters to lobby a 
reluctant state Legislature for school reform and a tax increase. Using a case study 
approach, this dissertation examined the public participation strategy used to mobilize 
and sustain public activism for the EIA. Using qualitative research methods, data were 
gathered from archival documents, private collections, organization strategies, and news 
media reports from the 1983-1984 EIA initiative, as well as interviews with key 
participants, who devised and sustained the citizen participation network and successful 
lobbying effort.    
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The balcony overlooking the House chambers filled up every day with grassroots 
supporters. The opposition made snide references to ‘all those teachers in the 
gallery, why weren’t they at home teaching?’ Also, on our desks was an ever 
growing pile of pink slips – slips with telephone numbers of constituents who had 
called and wanted us to call back, slips with the names of people waiting out in 
the lobby to talk to us about the bill. 
--South Carolina Representative Harriet Keyserling 
Against the Tide: One Woman’s Political Struggle 
For decades, both public education academic and monetary policies have been hotly 
debated by the South Carolina General Assembly.  Legislation included enactment of 
tough accountability requirements (1998), strict curriculum standards (2000), and high 
stakes testing (2001).  Recently, the state legislature has considered controversial issues, 
such as teacher pay for performance and tax credits or vouchers for private schools 
parents. Public schools also receive intense, annual scrutiny by the General Assembly 
during its appropriation proceedings, in part because public education comprises 40% of 
South Carolina’s total budget (http://www.scstatehouse.gov/). 
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Although always in the legislative spotlight, the school funding debate was never 
more intense than during the 1984 session when Gov. Richard W. Riley proposed an 
education reform package, entitled the Education Improvement Act (EIA). Broad and 
comprehensive in scope, the proposed school reforms were to be funded by a one cent 
increase in the state sales tax  
No elected official in South Carolina willingly embraces a statewide tax increase. 
Therefore, the Riley education proposal was launched at the worst possible time – an 
election year in which all members of the S.C. General Assembly were up for reelection. 
Most Statehouse observers, even those sympathetic to school improvement, gave the EIA 
and its penny tax little chance of receiving legislative approval in the 1984 election year. 
However, with a deliberate, coordinated strategy to build a county-by-county 
grassroots movement among public school supporters, which researchers likened to a 
political campaign, the unexpected happened (Chance, 1986). The EIA with its penny 
sales tax increase intact was approved by the state Legislature and signed into law in 
June, 1984. News accounts heralded the bill’s passage as a “miracle” (Norton, 1984, July 
1, p. 1A). However, the real miracle was mobilizing a strong, united education network 
where none existed. Persistent legislative lobbying on the part of public school supporters 
is largely credited with passage of the EIA. In the aftermath, Gov. Riley said the EIA 
grassroots initiative was praised by the RAND Corporation as the “most significant” of 
education reform efforts in the nation (personal communication, March 11, 2014). 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
The EIA effort remains unique in South Carolina. Similar statewide public 
education activism was not seen before or since the bill’s passage. With legal prohibitions 
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against public employee collective bargaining and no coordinated education 
organizations in South Carolina, actively engaging the public school community – 
particularly teachers and school administrators -- in any statewide policy initiative is 
difficult, particularly when passage of controversial school legislation is sought.  
Public school teachers make up the largest state employee group with over 40,000 
certified teachers working in the state’s 81 school districts, according to data from the 
S.C. Department of Education (http://www.ed.sc.gov/). With these numbers, public 
school teachers should be a formidable voting bloc in statewide elections. However, 
recent data indicated that public school teachers are not engaged in public policy at the 
most fundamental level: registering to vote and voting in statewide elections. 
A 2009 study (http://www.risesc.org/) of public school teacher voting during the 
2006 statewide elections indicated that over 50% of South Carolina’s teachers either 
chose not to vote in the 2006 elections or could not vote because they were not registered.  
The 2006 election was significant because it involved elections for governor, state 
education superintendent, and candidates for both the S.C. House of Representatives and 
state Senate. 
While the most direct way teachers and public education groups can influence 
state lawmakers is through the ballot box, South Carolina educators have other avenues to 
Statehouse influence. There are two voluntary teacher associations in South Carolina that 
employ Statehouse lobbyists. However, data show less than 40% of the state’s certified 
teachers belong to either organization. 
With low voter participation and no strong organizational structure to make their 
voices heard at the Statehouse, the education community in the Palmetto State appears to 
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be largely disengaged from state policy making. Consequently, educators seem silent or 
passive when it comes to legislative proposals affecting their classrooms, curriculum, or 
school funding. 
National studies have noted the policy disengagement of public school educators, 
even in states with prominent teacher unions. Since the enactment of state and federal 
accountability legislation in the late 1990s, national studies reported that public school 
teachers feel excluded in education policymaking.  
A number of national studies have described how “most teachers are clearly not a 
part” of policy formation and many “feel out of the loop” (Public Agenda, 2001, p. 18).  
The Public Agenda report labeled teachers a “neglected constituency” that felt “buffeted 
by forces beyond their control and decisions are taken without their input” (p. 18). A 
similar finding arose from a 2009 national survey of 40,000 teachers, financed by the Bill 
& Melinda Gates Foundation and Scholastic, Inc. Survey results showed teacher opinions 
are consistently overlooked in the formation of school policy (Sawchuk, 2010). 
“Teachers make up the bulk of the staffing in districts and schools, and they are the 
anchor of the profession. It seems to us their voices ought to really count,” wrote Vicki L. 
Phillips of the Gates Foundation. 
While there have been national studies of educator engagement in policy 
formation, none have focused on South Carolina, a state with no public employee 
collective bargaining rights and little lobbying power. Since passage of the EIA 30 years 
ago, few comprehensive school reform and funding packages have been presented for 
approval by the S.C. General Assembly. Nor has a grassroots movement by the education 
community arisen with such intensity that the state Legislature was compelled to increase 
5 
 
education funding. Therefore, this case study examined how educators and public school 
supporters throughout South Carolina mobilized around the issue of school improvement 
and increased funding, encouraged by a single-minded governor, who looked to the 
populace to make the change. 
1.2 Background 
 The 1957 launching of the Soviet Union satellite Sputnik sparked a nationwide 
debate over the status of scientific research and the preparation American public school 
students were receiving compared to their Russian counterparts. Questions centered on 
whether U.S. schools could produce students capable of overtaking the Soviet lead in 
what was termed the “Space Race.” 
 Twenty-six years later, a similar national debate arose, questioning the quality of 
American public education compared to education offered by other nations. The 1983 
publication of A Nation At Risk : The Imperative for Educational Reform, produced by 
U.S. Secretary of Education Terrel H. Bell’s National Commission on Excellence in 
Education, stated the country’s economic prosperity was threatened by a “rising tide of 
mediocrity” in its public schools, which undermined the achievement gains after the 
Sputnik reforms. It challenged the country’s school system to prepare students for the 
“Information Age,” already embraced by countries in the Far East and Europe.  
The Nation At Risk report specifically pointed to gains made by Japan and the 
academic achievement of its students according to test scores. Without improvements in 
American education, the report concluded that the nation’s competitive economic edge 
was at stake. (https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html. Consequently, education 
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focus in the U.S. shifted from Sputnik and scientific research to Toyota and economic 
development. 
 Despite the national report commissioned by his cabinet member, President 
Ronald Reagan did not place school reform as an administration priority. Instead, it was 
southern governors who responded to the challenge. An article in The Washington Post 
(1983, Sept. 28) reported that southern states were at the “forefront” of innovative school 
reform efforts, departing from their image of having “the most backward public schools 
in the nation” (p. A3). Leading school improvement proposals and promoting tax 
increases to pay for them were the work of governors throughout the South. 
Surprisingly, Southern governors appear to be spearheading the reform drive, 
reversing the region's history of underfunding education. Comprehensive 
education reform programs tied to increases in the state sales tax are pending in 
South Carolina and Tennessee. Similar programs have already been passed in 
Mississippi, Florida, and Arkansas” (Bencivenga, 1984). 
 The “southern education governors” were Bill Clinton of Arkansas, Robert Graham of 
Florida, William Winter of Mississippi, Richard Riley of South Carolina, and Lamar 
Alexander of Tennessee. 
Southern governors were “crucial” to the public education reform movement 
because “they mobilized the public and legislators in their states to support educational 
reforms” (Vinovskis, 1999, p. 7). Also supporting the governors was the Southern 
Regional Education Board (SREB), an influential committee made up of southern 
governors, state legislators, and state education officials. Prior to the release of A Nation 
At Risk, the SREB published The Need For Quality in 1981. This much publicized report 
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assisted governors in emphasizing education reform as an important state priority 
(Vinovskis, p. 19). 
Driven by widespread public interest generated by A Nation At Risk, southern 
governors embraced school reform as a way to overcome their states’ economic 
“backwardness,” which was a drag on the region’s ability to attract new industry and 
jobs. “The governors frequently mobilized the populace in order to overcome opposition 
from many of the state legislators who were reluctant to raise taxes for any cause – 
including education” (Vinovskis, p. 41). 
1.3 Purpose of the Study and Research Questions 
The purpose of this study is to document the efforts made by S.C. Gov. Richard W. 
Riley to build a statewide, unified grassroots network, county by county, rallying 
educators, business people, parents, and the public education community to aggressively 
promote passage of the 1984 Education Improvement Act (EIA).  Riley’s endeavor is 
notable because no formal, unifying statewide structure was in place to organize public 
school teachers, administrators, and education supporters in general. 
 Due to the uniqueness of the EIA effort, qualitative research study methods were 
employed to examine and document the grassroots community consensus building effort. 
Transcripts from one-on-one digitally recorded interviews were used to capture and 
analyze qualitative data from research participants. Interviews included political, 
governmental, business, education, academic, and community leaders involved in 
building and implementing the grassroots campaign for passage of the 1984 EIA. Among 
the interviewees were former U.S. Secretary of Education and S.C. Gov. Richard W. 
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Riley, members of his gubernatorial staff, educators, teacher association staff members, 
business leaders, academicians, and community education supporters. 
In addition to individual interviews, research included examining internal and 
external political documents, government publications, media reports, videotapes, 
speeches, community newsletters, and pamphlets. Also examined and analyzed were 
newspaper articles and editorials, public documents, business and association 
communications, and public relations material used during the campaign to enact the 
1984 legislation. Additionally, public documents from the Riley administration, housed at 
the S.C. Department of Archives and History, were reviewed, as well as papers from the 
personal collections of participants. 
The case study explored these broad-based topics: 
1) Initial strategies for passage of the EIA and its penny sales tax increase 
2) Organizing and sustaining lobbying efforts over time 
3) Steps taken to publicize the proposed bill and build citizen support for its 
passage 
4) Soliciting and engaging support among educators, parents, business leaders 
and community activists 
5) Building enthusiasm and encouraging the education community and the 
public to take an active role 
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1.4 Study Significance 
Examining the unique effort to gain passage of the EIA will contribute the 
following. First, there are no scholarly works describing the South Carolina school 
reform grassroots effort, the organization strategies used or revised, or the reaction and 
response of the state’s education community when asked to speak out. While there are 
publications that focused specifically on the involvement of the business community to 
aid passage of the reform bill, none exclusively provide an in-depth look at the grassroots 
organizing effort (Archer, 2013; Brown-Nagin, 1998). 
Second, a number of scholarly articles have examined the rise of “southern 
education reform governors” following the 1983 publishing of A Nation At Risk. These 
studies focused on the school reform efforts of Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton, Mississippi 
Gov. William Winter, Tennessee Gov. Lamar Alexander, and North Carolina Gov. Jim 
Hunt (Stallings, 2010; Thomas, 1992).  There are no scholarly publications that analyzed  
Gov. “Dick” Riley’s 1983 grassroots effort to pass his signature school reform 
legislation. Moreover, no studies have focused on the efforts of other southern education 
governors to build a statewide grassroots support system to enact their school reform 
initiatives during a legislative election year. 
In addition, during the 30
th
 anniversary of A Nation At Risk, a number of articles 
in academic journals, education publications, and the popular press recounted reform 
efforts in the South. While school initiatives in South Carolina were mentioned, the 
spotlight focused on Clinton, Alexander and Winter. In fact, many articles from 1983 to 
the present described the work of Alexander, Clinton, Winter, Hunt, and other southern 
governors during the 1980s school reform movement. However, few described the efforts 
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of Riley in South Carolina, even though he went on to serve as U.S. Secretary of 
Education during the Clinton administration. 
Third, scholars suggest education research has shifted away from examining 
school policy making on the state or federal levels and has moved toward research 
focused solely on the analysis of education policy. According to Frances Fowler (2006), 
the field of education policy making “tends to be rather atheretorical” (p. 42). Therefore, 
education researchers are more likely to set aside the making of state or federal school 
policy in favor of examining the policy itself, she indicated.  Consequently, this case 
study, which examined a southern state’s school policy making effort during the 1980s, is 
of value to the academic research field. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
As Maxwell (2005) wrote, a conceptual framework “is something structured, not found. 
It incorporates pieces that are borrowed from elsewhere, but the structure, the overall 
coherence, is something you build, not something that exists ready-made” (p. 39). It also 
begins “the process of bounding and framing the research by defining the larger 
theoretical, policy or social problem or issue of practice that the study will address” 
(Marshall & Rossman, 1999, p. 32). 
Therefore, the structure of this study was based on three essential components. 
First, the situated knowledge I brought to the case study. Second, the theoretical 
background used to inform the study. Third, academic literature pertinent to the topics 
and concepts reviewed for this case study.  
2.1 Situated Knowledge 
Because in qualitative research, the research instrument is the researcher herself, 
it is essential to describe the situated knowledge I brought to this case study.  I joined the 
staff of Gov. Dick Riley in 1983 after he was re-elected, becoming the first two-term 
governor of South Carolina. Prior to being hired as Riley’s speechwriter, I was a 
legislative reporter covering the S.C. Senate and a political reporter covering both state  
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and federal campaigns. From this vantage point, I was familiar with Riley’s work as 
governor in particular and important statewide issues in general. Riley had a long-
standing interest in public school issues, both as a state senator and during his first term 
as governor. Education was a priority in his first term; however, public school problems 
shared his attention with poverty, health, and environmental issues. Education became the 
central focus of his priorities upon the publishing of A Nation At Risk in 1983 and the 
1981 Southern Governor’s Education Association (SREB) report The Need for Quality. 
As the second term speechwriter, I was among a small group of Riley staff 
members, who devoted most of their working hours to efforts to pass what was to become 
Riley’s signature second term accomplishment, the 1984 Education Improvement Act 
funded by a one cent sales tax increase. Daily, I worked with key gubernatorial advisors – 
in particular, political advisor Bill Prince and education advisor Dr. Terry Peterson – 
crafting a unified message to explain the benefits of the EIA’s reforms. This included 
producing press releases to spur media interest and writing speeches for use by the 
governor, educators, and business supporters as they traveled the state to rally support for 
the reform measures and the essential need for the penny funding. The slogan for the 
campaign was encapsulated in the bumper sticker “A Penny For Their Thoughts.” 
One lasting memory from that time was huddling around the computer in the 
governor’s press office with Bill Prince and Terry Peterson, writing and rewriting talking 
points and speeches for EIA supporters. During 1983, there seemed to be no occasion – a 
business consortium, a funeral eulogy, or the opening of hunting season – without linking 
the event to the need for funding school reform. 
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Although I attended none of the regional community rallies, I participated in 
reviewing the written comments collected from the public at the small group sessions that 
followed the forums. The small group sessions solicited recommendations and 
observations about the EIA components. Many of these observations and suggestions 
became elements in subsequent speeches. 
As legislative opposition rose, especially to the tax increase, specific speeches 
were written to highlight the necessity of the EIA funding to counteract arguments 
against the one cent sales tax increase. The culmination of this endeavor was a statewide 
30-minute television address by Gov. Riley to reinforce the benefits of the reforms and 
the necessity of a permanent means to pay for it. Broadcasted by S.C. Education 
Television and by all the state’s commercial television stations, the governor’s November 
address was unprecedented.  No other statewide gubernatorial television address, 
promoting the need for legislative action, had occurred before or since then. In the 
aftermath of its passage, I produced speeches and press releases as the EIA and sales tax 
increase were put into effect, including other initiatives to maintain and expand the 
reforms of the 1984 law. 
The firsthand knowledge I bring to this case study underscored my belief that 
when properly motivated, those who support public education can wield the political 
power that their numbers suggest. As previously noted, the unique public involvement in 
state school reform has not been replicated since the EIA effort. There has been no 
prominent state leader who championed public education since the Riley administration.  
Nor have public school teachers been vocal in their attitudes toward controversial issues, 
such as pay based on student test scores, school and teacher report cards, or promotion of 
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private school vouchers funded by out-of-state interests -- a particular issue favored by 
governors over the past ten years. Witnessing the power that teachers, administrators, and 
public school supporters can exert in the Legislature and during election years make this 
case study not only important to the research field, but also to demonstrate the impact 
educators can make when unified and motivated. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
 Because this study examined the impact of public engagement in the legislative 
process, four theoretical lens were used to guide and analyze the research. All four 
theories focus on the how’s and why’s citizens are drawn into the public sphere, and the 
impact they can make. These theories are political action theory, citizen empowerment 
and engagement theory, critical theory, and feminist theory. 
2.2.1 Political action theory. 
 Political action theory arises from three foundational concepts: societal 
modernization, mobilizing agencies, and social and cultural motivation. (Norris, 2002).  
1) Societal modernization: this theoretical concept is based historically on the 
industrialization of Western societies and the rise of the educated class during the late 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. As democracies modernized, community interests shifted 
from rural populations with low skills and high illiteracy. Before this change, tightly knit 
local communities resulted in narrow social and geographic influences. Rural populations 
focused exclusively on their own families and problems with little participation in society 
outside their communities.   
 With modernization, basic schooling increased, populations shifted from rural to 
urban settings, and skilled labor opportunities arose from industrialization and 
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manufacturing. By World War II, the service sector, both in the public and private 
spheres, had grown, requiring more education, specified skills, and specialization in 
professions, such as finance, science, technology, and trade. Governmental bureaucracy 
also grew to serve the needs of an expanding urban population and a growing military. 
The third shift came after World War II, as the population moved from urban to suburban 
communities. The growth of suburbia signaled a rise in the middle class, higher education 
attainment fueled by the G.I. Bill, and increased methods of public communication 
through media advances made during the war.  
Political scientists, who subscribe to modernization theory, assert that a rise in 
literacy, education, and communication methods fueled citizen engagement and 
participation. “Growing levels of human capital, in particular, should plausibly serve to 
buttress and strengthen citizen participation. Studies have long established that education, 
and the cognitive skills that it provides, is one of the factors that most strongly predicts 
individual political activism” (Norris, 2002, p. 3). 
  2) Mobilizing agencies: In contrast to political action based on historical and 
economic developments, some political scientists embrace the influence of social 
agencies to mobilize citizen engagement. These social agencies include volunteer 
organizations, churches, unions, political parties, and the news media. These groups 
provide the face-to-face networking and community or special interest bonds to build the 
social trust needed to motivate citizen activism. 
 The rise of social media outlets to promote ideas and public discussion is a more 
recent way to build community and mobilization, although not face-to-face. While 
coverage of issues and commentary do not take the form of traditional mobilizing 
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agencies, widespread access to media may be even more potent to participatory activism 
and/or citizen interest and discussion.  
3) Social and cultural motivation:  The third component of political action theory 
is social and cultural motivation based on the personal characteristics of the individual. 
The key to civic activism is personal motivation. 
Norris (2002) stated motivational attitudes are affective, such as a sense of duty or 
patriotism or a response to a personal benefit. Those with advanced education (college or 
above), higher income, and professional careers tend to be more politically active. Based 
on the Civic Voluntarism Model, increased resources have been employed by individuals 
who are predisposed to civic engagement. Educational levels and socio-economic status 
factor in to an individual’s civic engagement. In addition, social connections – families, 
neighbors, co-workers, churches, associations, and civic organizations – are used as 
channels for personal activism (Norris, 2002).  
“Many cultural attitudes and values may shape activism,” Norris wrote, 
“including the sense the citizen can affect the policy process (internal political efficacy) 
and political interest, as well as a general orientation of support from the political 
system” (p. 8). However, during the past several decades, an increase in cynicism toward 
government representation has led to a decline in democratic engagement, including 
voting. 
2.2.2 Citizen empowerment and engagement theory. 
Much like political action theory, citizen empowerment and engagement theory 
examines the practical steps to actively involve citizens in issues having a direct impact 
on their current and future wellbeing. Rocha (1997) asserted that both individual 
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empowerment and community empowerment are developmental. Drawing on scholarly 
research, Rocha described the four step ladder to citizen empowerment (p. 33). 
First is the concept that “It strengthens me,” whereby the individual gains feelings 
of power by associating with something or someone outside himself, such as involvement 
or following a charismatic leader. This leads to the second step when the individual 
develops a feeling of personal self-sufficiency. The third step is the sense of having an 
impact on others, which Rocha summarized as the word “assertion.” The person begins to 
think of himself as a “help-giver,” instead of a “help-receiver” (p. 33).  This development 
gives rise to the fourth step, “‘I gain strength from serving/influencing others.’ This stage 
is characterized by the concepts of togetherness and moralized action” (p. 33).  
Through these four steps, the citizen grows from an individual locus to a 
community locus, depending on the context of the situation and its impact on the 
individual. From his study of empowerment and engagement theories, Rocha described 
five points on the empowerment continuum: Atomistic Individual empowerment, the 
Embedded Individual, Mediated empowerment, Socio-political empowerment, and 
Political empowerment. 
Drawing from the traditional understanding of empowerment, the Atomistic 
Individual concept arises from the support of powerful others. However, Rocha stated 
this is the least effective when addressing social problems (p. 34). Depending on the 
situational context, the Embedded Individual draws strength from an organization and the 
channel to participation it provides. Embedded Individual participation can be through 
voluntarism or involvement in the organization’s decision making. In this form, however, 
individuals decide how much or how little they want to be involved (Rocha, p. 35). 
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In Mediated Empowerment, an expert or professional acts as an advisor to the citizen. 
In order for help to be given, the professional or expert must explain the successes and 
“pitfalls’ of participation, which must be fully understood and accepted by the individual 
(Rocha, p. 37). 
Based on Freire’s work on critical consciousness, Socio-Political empowerment uses 
collaborative grassroots political activism as a benchmark (Rocha, p. 38). Sometimes 
referred to as “transformative populism,” this stage changes the community from 
bystanders to actors in and through this empowerment stage (Rocha, p. 37). This allows 
the community to move beyond individual action to collaborative action and from short 
term benefits to more lasting political power. 
Developing empowerment into political action for institutional change is the hallmark 
of Political Empowerment. Resulting in voting and voting representation, Political 
Empowerment motivates a collaborative effort by individuals, who encompass wide 
geographic representation. The goals of Political Empowerment are legislative 
transformation, thereby altering the legal relationship between community members and 
the political environment. “Although the individual is the ultimate receptor of benefits, 
political power is the goal and political process the means” (Rocha, p. 40). 
Although Rocha (1997) described the four steps to empowerment, he asked, “How 
can local organizations be motivated to encompass empowerment objectives and 
processes? This is a difficult question” (p. 41). 
In a qualitative study of 100 citizen engagement cases in 20 countries, Gaventa and 
Barrett (2010) found citizen engagement can make a difference in democratic outcomes 
(p. 12). Their study showed citizen participation in public issues can increase government 
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responsiveness. However, like the empowerment ladder described by Rocha, Gaventa 
and Barrett (2010) found that “successful outcomes are not a straight line but linked 
through organizing skills and thickness of civic networks. As individuals grow in their 
sense of self efficacy and engagement, they benefit from a thickening of alliances and 
relationships that in turn encourage greater participation” (p. 30). 
Regarding the link between organizing skills and thickness of civic networks, 
Gaventa and Barrett (2010) observed: 
 Having a sense of citizenship is one thing, translating that sense into action is 
another (p.33). Knowledge is the first step to action; using knowledge effectively 
is the next. Greater skills and knowledge translate to new forms of action. 
 If citizen participation is merely cosmetic, it can result in negative outcomes, even 
if positive outcomes and government responsiveness are abundant. In some cases, 
the changes sought are not sustainable. 
 Associations and social movements are much more likely to get a responsive, 
positive outcome. 
The authors concluded that engaging citizens in a social movement did not arise 
automatically, but needed intermediary measures to promote engagement (p. 59). 
2.2.3 Critical theory.  
Critical theorists focus their research questions on the oppression and domination 
of stakeholders within a system. Critical inquiry research challenges the status quo, 
examines situations in terms of conflict and oppression, and seeks to bring about change 
(Crotty, 1998).  This theoretical lens advances the idea of praxis, a dynamic combination 
20 
 
of self-reflection and authentic action.  It also encompasses the power of dialogue, 
fellowship, and community.   
Power and society are at the center of critical discourse. Critical ethnographers are 
not the only ones focused on power, but they “are almost alone in treating power as the 
central concept either to explain or help explain the research” (Quantz, 1992, p. 478). It is 
not only power, but its context within history, that interests critical theorists. This is not 
so much grand narrative, but an examination of people and power within a certain context 
(Quantz, 1992). 
As Kicheloe, McLauren & Steinburg (2011) explained, the best understanding of 
critical theory is within “the context of empowering individuals” (p. 164). Research 
within the frame of critical theory addresses the oppression of people and embraces the 
political nature of the research. Critical theorists contend those oppressed by a 
dominating power structure begin to internalize the attitudes of the oppressors, thus 
adopting a “culture of silence.” Crotty (1998) observed, “Not only do they not have a 
voice, but worse still, they are unaware that they have no voice,” undermining their right 
to participation  ( p. 154). 
Noted Brazilian educator and philosopher Paulo Freire (1970) insisted that those 
at the center of the research process are partners in the research itself. Leaders of change 
must understand the reality of the circumstances of oppression within its historical 
context (p. 67). It is through dialogue between the leader and participants that all become 
“jointly responsible for a process in which they all grow” (p. 80). However, change does 
not come from dialogue alone. Rather, Freire (1970) stated, “Critical reflection is also 
action” (p. 128). “In this communion, both groups grow together, and the leaders, instead 
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of simply being self-appointed, are installed or authenticated in their praxis with the 
praxis of the people” (p. 130). 
The political nature of education has become a greater focus in current research. 
Carspecken and Apple (1992) wrote that the “nature of power” as an orienting framework 
“provides a conceptual and normative orientation that organizes the questions critical 
researchers ask” (p. 510). Qualitative methodology form a firm platform for critical 
research since the research is based on certain concerns and questions. “Critical 
researchers are usually politically minded people who wish, through their research, to aid 
struggles against inequality and domination” (Carspecken & Apple, 1992, p. 512).  
The scope of this case study was a good fit within a critical theoretical framework 
since critical theorists seek to understand the “experience of individuals within their 
social organizations” and promote “human agency” (LeCompte, 1993).  
2.2.4 Feminist theory. 
Feminist theory is appropriate to an examination of educator activism in South 
Carolina school policy making because the vast majority of the state’s public school 
teachers are women. According to 2009-2010 figures from the S.C. Department of 
Education, there were 48,258 certified teachers in South Carolina. Of these, 37,365, or 
77.4%, are women; 8,541, or 17.7%, are men. Because women make up more than three-
fourths of the state’s public school educators, it is fair to conclude that a case study of 
comprehensive school reform falls within the feminist theory framework.  
Policy making in South Carolina is a man’s world. Although the state currently 
has its first female governor, the majority of elected officials in South Carolina are men. 
According to 2010 figures compiled by the Southeastern Institute for Women in Politics, 
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South Carolina ranked 50
th
 nationally in the number of women elected to public office on 
any level (http://scelectswomen.com/). 
With the exception of the current governor, all previous South Carolina governors 
were men. Also, with the exception of the late Nancy Stevenson’s four years as lieutenant 
governor (1979-1983), all state lieutenant governors are and have been men. South 
Carolina government is dominated by the state Legislature, yet currently there are only 
two women among the 46 members of the S.C. Senate. There are 15 women in the state 
House of Representatives. 
Although women make up a majority of the state’s educators, only three women 
have served as state Superintendent of Education, a statewide elected office. These 
women are Barbara Neilson, who served from 1990-1998, and Inez Tennenbaum, who 
served from 1998-2007. The third female superintendent, Molly Spearman, was elected 
in November 2014. Most public education policy is developed and carried out at the state 
level; therefore, the lack of women in positions to influence school policy is notable.  
Feminist research is based largely on qualitative methods, relaying the woman’s 
point of view, giving voice “as best she can to those who have been silenced” 
(Visweswaran, 1997, p. 614). Therefore, the lens of feminist theory is appropriate as one 
of the theoretical foundations of this case study. 
Rebecca Campbell and Sharon Wasco (2000) wrote in Feminist Approaches to 
Social Science: Epistemological and Methodological Tenets, “The overarching goal of 
feminist research is to identify the ways in which multiple forms of oppression impact 
women’s lives and empower women to tell their stories by providing a respectful and 
egalitarian research environment” (p.787). 
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According to Ardovini-Brooker (2002), feminist methodology also “produces 
generalized knowledge-claims on the basis of experience,” a sharing of information, 
acknowledging oppression, and taking into account her own personal experiences as part 
of the research process.  “Feminist research is distinctive in that the research is political 
in nature and has the potential to bring about change in women’s lives” (p. 9).  
Using qualitative methodology for this case study fits well with feminist theory 
because the feminist perspective is “distinct from other approaches in that it links theory 
and practice and, in doing so, highlights the significance of personal narratives, lived 
experience, subjectivity, and political praxis (hook , 2000)” (Dhamoon, 2013). 
 As Virginia Olsen (2000) wrote in Feminisms and Qualitative Research at and 
into the New Millennium, “For me, feminist inquiry is dialectical,” thereby justifying 
qualitative research methods (p. 216). However, a qualitative approach is seldom used in 
governmental policymaking, which tends to be “largely quantitative and male 
dominated” and “has not been a receptive focus for feminist qualitative research whatever 
the field” (p. 217). 
Although not all those involved in the EIA effort were women, the participation 
of  women as active lobbyists had a significant impact on the outcome of the EIA’s 
passage. With raising teachers’ salaries to the Southeastern average as a major 
component of the EIA, it can be argued that enactment of the S.C. school reform bill was 
the making of feminist governmental policy. Therefore, Feminist theory serves as a 
natural lens through which to examine the research questions. 
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2.3 Review of Related Studies 
 To understand the contribution of this case study to academic research, it is 
essential to identify where it falls within scholarly literature exploring similar themes: 
educator policy inclusion and engagement, voter participation, feminist political activism, 
the influence of maternal governmental policies, and the impact of school reform in the 
1980s.  The following review of related academic studies demonstrates what this case 
study would add to current literature on the engagement of the education community in 
state school policy. 
2.3.1 Southern education reform in the 1980s. 
In his examination of the school reform effort during the 1980s, William Chance 
(1986) noted “a new reassertion of the public interest” when education became a priority 
among governors and state legislatures (p. iii). He wrote that the word “revolution” was 
often used to describe the movement, but he suggested that was too strong a term. 
However, he asserted that decade displayed a shift from previous routine, mundane 
legislative bills to proposals of a “higher purpose.” Thus, “conveying an implication of 
the future meaningful involvement of a much broader coalition” (Chance, 1986, p. 3). 
 In the first modern wave of education reform following the October 1957 Soviet 
launching of Sputnik, the federal government took the lead in boosting education, 
especially in math and science. In contrast, the 1983 A Nation At Risk, published by the 
National Commission on Excellence in Education, was the catalyst for governors and 
state legislatures to take the lead with an array of reforms and funding initiatives (Doyle 
& Hartle, 1985). 
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    Although A Nation At Risk is often thought to be the springboard of the national 
school reform movement, states already were embracing the issue. According to Doyle 
and Hartle (1985), observers were surprised by actions undertaken by the states; however, 
“the truth is the states have quietly become the most important actors in education policy 
making” (p. 22). For example, reports from the Education Commission of the States 
(ECS) noted similar needs for school improvement, and most states responded, 
particularly those in the South. 
 Chris Pipho (1984), deputy director of the ECS Information Clearinghouse, cited 
nine states for their extraordinary reform efforts. Of these, six states were in the South. 
Tennessee Gov. Lamar Alexander and Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton called for special 
legislative sessions to deal with public school funding. South Carolina Gov. Dick Riley 
was noted for mobilizing citizens to pressure the S.C. General Assembly to pass his 
“New Approach to Quality Education,” funded by a statewide one cent sales tax increase.  
In West Virginia, Virginia, and Georgia, Gov. John D. Rockefeller IV, Gov. Charles 
Robb, and Gov. Joe Frank Harris, respectively, called for significant increases in teacher 
pay. 
 An extension of the southern effort was the establishment of the Southern Growth 
Policies Board (SGPB), chaired by Alexander. In 1983, North Carolina Gov. Jim Hunt 
served as chairman of the ECS’s Task Force on Education and Economic Growth. That 
same year, the Southern Regional Education Board (SREB) Task Force on Higher 
Education and the Schools was created.  Gubernatorial activism was extended with the 
formation of the 1985 ECS task force on teaching, leadership, parent involvement, 
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student readiness, and technology, chaired by Alexander with Clinton serving as vice 
chairman. 
These national and regional committees were examples of the collaboration by 
southern governors to grow their lagging economies through education improvement 
(Gitterman, 2011). Gitterman wrote that governors mobilized the public in support of job 
growth through better education in order to convince reluctant state legislatures that more 
school funding was essential for economic development (p. 38). 
2.3.2 Educator surveys regarding inclusion in policy making. 
Recent national surveys have found teachers decry their lack of involvement in 
school policy making. One example is the 2001 national report by Public Agenda, which 
focused on teacher civic engagement. Of significance is that the report was issued the 
same year as the sweeping federal No Child Left Behind school legislation was enacted.  
 Entitled Just Waiting To Be Asked?, the study examined the attitudes of education 
stakeholders, including teachers (Farkas, Foley & Duffett, 2001). In addition to finding 
teachers were the “most disgruntled” about the decision making process, the report stated 
“most teachers are clearly not a part” of policymaking. Seventy percent of the surveyed 
teachers said they felt “out of the loop” when it came to school decision making (p. 18).  
Many said policymakers are not interested in their input. 
In addition, the Public Agenda study reported a surprising 70% of the 404 public 
school teachers surveyed never heard of public engagement. After being asking more 
specific questions on public engagement, 42% of the teacher said that they were 
involved. In contrast, 78% of their superintendents reported faculty public engagement 
efforts in their districts (Farkas, Foley & Duffett, 2001). 
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Similarly, a 2003 Public Agenda study reported that three out of four American 
teachers felt that they had become “scapegoats for all the problems facing education and 
sense little support from administrators or parents” (Public Agenda, 2003). Drawing from 
data collected from a national survey of 1,345 K-12 public school teachers, Public 
Agenda reported an attitude of “vulnerability” among teachers, bolstering their support 
for tenure and trusting their teacher unions to “stand by me.” 
2.3.3 Teachers’ roles in political engagement. 
In a 1963 essay, Robert E. Cleary of the George Peabody College for Teachers 
wrote that educators give up their ability to shape educational policy unless they are 
willing to get involved in political activism. Cleary observed that for decades educators 
“have been extremely careful to avoid involvement in politics, or even the appearance of 
political involvement” (p. 323). He wrote, “This ignores the fact that public education is 
almost completely dependent on government for its financing” (p. 324). 
Lack of knowledge about the political process and failing to embrace political 
activism “has led the typical teacher in the United States to forfeit his right to a powerful 
voice in the determination of educational questions” (Cleary, 1963, p. 327). The author 
concluded that the best way for educators to get involved in policymaking is through 
education lobbying organizations. 
However, educators may be reluctant to express political views due to court 
decisions and pressure from school administrators. Wohl (2009) wrote that since 1960, 
federal court rulings have narrowed teachers’ First Amendment right to free speech (p. 
1319). He found that while teacher unions are attacked on ideological grounds, they have 
“essential dignity and professionalism, as well as on-the-job protections to a professional 
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that had few such protections and was often treated arbitrarily and abusively by 
administrators” (p. 1314). 
Pressure from school administrators may be one reason South Carolina’s teachers 
are not more politically proactive. Staff members at the Center for Educator Recruitment, 
Retention and Advancement (CERRA) at Winthrop University reported that at a meeting 
of South Carolina’s teachers of the year, the most prevalent reason that educators gave 
for their reluctance to become politically involved was concern over the reaction of their 
administrators (personal communication, July, 2011). 
2.3.4 Political engagement through voting. 
 South Carolina educators and voting.  
 The most fundamental way a citizen can participate in the political process is 
through the ballot box. Registering to vote and voting in local, state, and national 
elections is a direct way citizens can influence policymakers. However, a 2009 study 
found South Carolina’s teachers are not engaged in the voting process. 
RISESC, a non-profit public school advocacy group, conducted a study of voting 
participation by the state’s certified teachers in the 2006 statewide elections, which 
included races for governor and state superintendent of education 
(http://www.risesc.org/).  Data showed 47.4% of teachers voted in the 2006 election, 
22.4% were registered but did not vote, and 30.1% were not registered.  Consequently, 
over half of the state’s teachers either chose not to vote in the 2006 elections or could not 
because they were not registered to vote.   
     Although the votes of all citizens are important, it could be said that the outcome 
of elections weigh particularly heavy on those employed in the public sector. Public  
employees, who directly derive their livelihoods from all levels of government, may bear 
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the brunt of policies directed at their professions. This is particularly true for teachers, as 
stricter requirements on curriculum standards, student testing, and teacher evaluation are 
imposed at the state and federal levels. Unlike most states, South Carolina law prohibits 
collective bargaining by public employees. However, the state’s educators may join two 
state associations that monitor school policy development, provide emailed legislative 
updates, and lobby at the Statehouse on their behalf.  These associations are the Palmetto 
State Teachers Association (PSTA) and the South Carolina Education Association 
(SCEA), an affiliate of the National Education Association (NEA). 
However, the number of teachers joining these associations, which require yearly 
dues, is small compared to the number of public school teachers statewide. In 2011, the 
SCEA had 11,000 members (J. Hick, personal communication, April, 2011). The PSTA 
had 6,800 members (T. Lewis, personal communication, April, 2011). Combined, the 
associations represented 17,800 teachers statewide, or 36.8% of certified teachers. 
Even without union representation, teachers can be a powerful political force 
through the sheer number of members belonging to a teacher association. This was 
demonstrated in July, 2010 when the Alabama Education Association (AEA) defeated a 
candidate in the Republican gubernatorial primary due to his opposition to the 
association’s education proposals. The AEA-backed candidate went on to win the 
governorship (http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/state_edwatch/2010/07/). 
Like South Carolina, Alabama law prohibits collective bargaining by state 
employees. However, the AEA had far greater membership numbers than South 
Carolina’s teacher associations. Although there were 47,500 certified teachers in 
Alabama in 2010, the AEA had 104,000 members. This strongly suggests that in addition 
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to current and retired teachers, Alabama public education supporters were also members 
of the AEA, adding to its political clout. 
National voting patterns.  
Data from a number of national studies and surveys indicated a little over half of 
the nation’s eligible voters cast a ballot in the November 2004 national elections. The 
largest portion of those voting were college-educated woman (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2006). Subsequent analysis found that the most predominant reason eligible voters did 
not vote was because “policymakers don’t care what I say” (Stein & Owens, 2005).  
While respondents said it was not difficult for them to register, those surveyed said that 
they either were “too busy” to register and vote or uninterested in the political system.  
Surveys also indicated the higher the education level, the higher the percentage of those 
registered to vote and voting in elections. 
In addition to feeling overlooked in education policy development, national 
survey data indicated public school teachers said they felt blamed when education 
problems surface. Other studies showed that teachers had little understanding of what 
civic engagement entailed, a finding that might shed light on the 2009 study of South 
Carolina educators’ voting participation. 
Influences on voters participation. 
Many think American citizens vote out of a sense of patriotic duty. Yet, research 
has shown it is the frequency of political discussions and the influence of groups that 
bring voters to the ballot box. In the 2005 study Interests, Parties, and Social 
Embeddedness: Why Rational People Vote, Abrams, Iversen and Soskice found that the 
best predictor of voting behavior is “interpersonal discussion networks.” These networks 
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included family, close friends, coworkers, and social groups. According to the study, 
group interactions nurtured an interest in political discussions. These interactions also 
promoted “an important source of respect and standing in the groups and networks to 
which people belong” (Abrams, Iversen & Soskice, 2005, p. 2). 
According to the study, political groups increased their influence by establishing 
themselves as “elites,” giving voters the incentive to learn about party candidates and to 
vote. However, Abrams, Iversen and Soskice (2005) stated that the incentive to vote 
“depends on the strength of collective organizations, such as parties, unions, and 
churches” (p. 10). Therefore, the authors concluded that the strongest predictor of voting 
is “whether politics is discussed” (p. 16). 
Do people vote in their own best interest? In An Exploration of Correct Voting in 
Recent U.S. Presidential Elections, Lau, Andersen and Redlawsk  (2008) found that 
about three-fourths of citizens voted “correctly,” only if they had “a fully informed 
preference” (p. 406). By “correct” voting, the authors meant citizens voting for 
candidates who would carry out policies that the voters support and will be to their 
benefit. “For democracy to work the way it is supposed to, citizens must also vote for the 
candidate, or party, who best represents their interests and concerns” (Lau, Andersen & 
Redlawsk, 2008, p. 405).  
The study found “correct” voting depended on political knowledge, interest in 
politics, distinct differences between the candidates, and group affiliations, especially 
participation in party politics. Many of these variables mirrored the findings of Abrams, 
Iversen and Soskice (2005) that asserted likely voters are those involved with a group that 
discusses political issues.    
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Voting and registration by election year, participation and gender.  
Despite 2006 being an off-year election, the U.S. Census Bureau reported some 
96 million people voted in that year’s congressional and statewide elections, an increase 
of 7 million voters over the 2002 off-year election. While national election years turn out 
the greatest number of voters, the Census Bureau noted that 48% of the nation’s voting 
age population voted in 2006, the highest level since 1994 when the bureau began 
collecting voting data (http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases). While men (69.1%) 
and women (72.8%) are about equal in voter registration on the national, state, and 
county levels, more women (53.1%) voted than men (46.9%) in 2006. 
  An examination of U.S. Census Bureau data showed that South Carolina was 
close to the national average in the number of people registered and voting in the 2006 
elections. In the U.S., an average of 68% of the voting age population were registered to 
vote, and 71% of those registered voted in the 2006 elections (http://www.census.gov). 
This meant a third of the nation’s voters were not registered, slightly higher than the 29% 
of non-registered voters in South Carolina.  However, the Bureau noted that registration 
and voting rates are “historically lower” in off-year elections, compared to presidential 
election years. As in South Carolina, about half of the states had both congressional and 
gubernatorial elections in 2006. 
  Voting participation by education level and/or profession.  
National voting analysts point out that the higher the education level of the voter, 
the higher the percentage of those who are registered and vote. The reverse is true of 
those with a high school degree, GED, or no degree. The less the education, the less 
likely the person will vote. In the 2006 off-year election, 78% of those holding a 
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bachelor’s degree or above were registered to vote, and 61% voted, according to 
government statistics. 
There is limited research comparing voter participation among professions. 
However, two studies were found that speak to this issue. A study published by the 
Society of General Internal Medicine showed doctors voted less frequently than lawyers 
or the general public in both national and off-year elections (Grande, Asche & 
Armstrong, 2007). In the 2002 off-year elections, a third of the country’s doctors voted 
compared to 54% of lawyers, and 42% of the general public (Grande, Asche & 
Armstrong, 2007, p.587). According to a report by the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, economics majors have strong political party identification and tend to make 
political donations, but that did not influence their decisions to vote in an election, 
(Allgood, Bosshardt, van der Klaauw & Watts, 2010). The study also found that students 
seeking a business degree were less likely to vote than those seeking a liberal arts degree 
(Allgood, Bosshardt, van der Klaauw & Watts, 2010, p. 23). 
These findings seem to contradict data indicating education level and professional 
careers motivate voters to go to the polls. Therefore, the authors concluded, “[t]here is 
more to the story than simply ‘being educated’ -- so that what people study in college, or 
what they choose to study, is associated with their civic behaviors many years after they 
graduate” (Allgood, Bosshardt, van der Klaauw & Watts, 2010, p. 24).  
Reasons given as to why citizens do not register to vote.  
According to national statistics for the 2006 elections, the U.S. Census Bureau 
reported 32% of voting age citizens were not registered to vote, similar to the percentage 
of non-registered teachers in South Carolina.  However, Census data also showed that 
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78%  of citizens holding a college degree were registered to vote and 61% voted in the 
2006 elections. In comparison, 69.8%  of South Carolina’s teachers were registered to 
vote in 2006 and 47.4% voted in the 2006 state elections.  
In a 2006 national survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for The People 
and The Press (http://www.people-press.org), the most frequent reason given by voters 
who failed to register is that they are “too busy.”  Describing these non-registered citizens 
as “politically estranged,” the researchers found that this group was the least interested in 
politics and the most likely to say “voting doesn’t change things” (p. 4). They also 
concluded these Americans are “more socially isolated from other people.” A quarter of 
the study’s respondents had lived in their neighborhoods less than a year, and only 27%  
said that “people can be trusted.” 
Why do citizens fail to vote? Data suggested that it was not due to registration 
barriers. In an American National Election Study (ANES) for the 2008 election, 70% of 
the non-registered respondents said “it is not difficult for me to vote”   
(http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/). The ANES survey reported that there was no 
one dominant answer as to why the respondents did not register. Reasons split among “no 
time,” recently moved, and no interest in politics (p. 4).  
The ANES, based at the University of Michigan’s Center for Political Studies, has 
tracked national voter trends since 1952. Its national surveys on the 2004 and 2008 
presidential elections showed that only 11% of the respondents said they were not 
registered to vote in 2004 and 14% in 2008. This contrasted with the 2006 election data 
reported by the Census Bureau; however, it is important to note that ANES studies are 
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conducted during presidential election years when voter participation is significantly 
higher.  
When examined by the gender of non-registered voters, the ANES study found 
10% of women respondents said they were not registered in 2004 and 12% in 2008. By 
educational level, the survey reported that only 2% of the respondents with college 
degrees or above were not registered to vote in 2004. That percentage rose to 4% in the 
2008 national election year. 
 Reasons given as to why registered voters did not vote in 2006. 
Among democracies in the western world, the United States consistently has had 
the lowest voter turnout rate (Stein, Leighly & Owens, 2005). In a report to the Federal 
Election Commission (FEC) examining the 2004 presidential election data, research 
indicated that Americans voted out of habit, the “high status” of their education and 
standing in the community, and through social networking (Stein, Leighly & Owens, p. 
3). In fact, the FEC study found that many people voted simply because “they were asked 
to vote by a candidate, political party, or friend” (p. 6). As indicated in previous data, 
high status and networking led to greater voter participation. 
  Along with higher educational levels, political efficacy – the belief that a citizen 
can influence the outcome of political decisions – also influenced people to vote, a 
finding previously cited in the 2008 Lau, Andersen & Redlawsk study. However, the 
FEC study did not find distrust in government as a reason registered voters decided not to 
vote (p. 5). Over time, Census Bureau data showed that registered voters, who decided 
not to vote, consistently said they were “too busy (to vote) or had a conflicting schedule.” 
Census data from the 2006 elections resulted in similar findings. Of the 27.3% of 
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registered voters who did not vote in the 2006 elections, “too busy” to vote or “not 
interested” were the most prevalent answers. 
A Pew Institute report on the 2004 presidential election found similar responses. 
According to the 2006 Pew Research Center study, over half the registered voters, who 
did not vote in the 2004 election, said that they were not interested in politics.  Seventy-
six percent of the non-voters stated that they knew “little about the candidates,” and 42%  
said they “were bored by what goes on in D.C.”  In contrast, 91% of regular voters said 
they were interested in politics, and 72% said they felt guilty if they do not vote, 
according to the Pew Center report. 
According to the 2006 Census Bureau’s election survey, employment did not have 
a bearing on who voted. However, voters with a family income of $50,000 or more were 
more likely to vote than families with lower incomes. The Census survey also indicated 
that geographic location had an impact on voter turnout. In the 2006 elections, those 
living in the South were less likely to vote than citizens in other areas of the country, 
according to the report. 
One finding that surprised federal researchers was that households with children 
in the home were less likely to vote than those without children. Researchers found this 
remarkable since it was thought parents would have a more vested interest in voting  due 
to the impact of public policy on the futures of their children. 
2.3.5 Participation of women in policymaking and governance. 
Women in elected office. 
Since the Second Wave of the Feminist Movement in the 1970s, there are 
considerable data showing an increase in American women holding elected office. 
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Studies also showed that when women run for office, they were just as likely to win as 
their male opponents. Despite these positive findings, the United States lagged behind 
other western democracies in the number of women in elected office, both at the national 
and state levels. 
According to Lawless and Fox (2005), data confirmed that males dominated U.S. 
political offices. Based on 2004 data, the authors pointed out that the United States 
ranked 57
th
 world-wide in the percentage (14.9%) of women in national legislatures, 
below the global average of 15.6%.  That same year, 84% of U.S. governors, 86% of big-
city mayors, and 77% of state legislators were men. As a result, American women had 
few female role models in elected office. The question then became “Who are 
representatives of women? The short answer is men” (Childs & Lovenduski, 2013, p. 
494). 
This led McDonagh (2009) to label the U.S. a “laggard state,” due to the scarcity 
of women in elected office and the subsequent lack of maternal policies that women 
policymakers support.  Furthermore, the low percentage of women officeholders had a 
“symbolic impact on public attitude” (author’s emphasis), McDonagh wrote (p. 18). She 
pointed out that not only did the U.S. lag other modern democracies in the percentage of 
women in office, no American woman had become president, compared to 44% in other 
contemporary democracies (p.119). 
Maternal governmental policies. 
 Maternal policies are those which emphasis care and concern for society’s 
individuals. These are education, health care, assistance for the needy, among others. 
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When a government adopts maternal policies, it reinforces a woman’s place and value in 
the policy making sphere.  
The power of maternal public policy is “crucial” to determining public attitudes 
toward women as political leaders (McDonagh, p. 81). Also important is the number of 
women elected officials, and the role models they present that encourage more women to 
participate in the political policy sphere. According to McDonagh, elected office 
advances women from the private domain of women’s clubs and political support groups 
to the public platform of policymaking (p. 97). 
Of significance, the presence of women in elected office and the corresponding 
impact of maternal social policies extended to voter attitudes toward government and 
increased the likelihood that citizens will vote. (McDonagh, p. 99). 
 The “gendered psyche.” 
 Lawless and Fox (2005) contended that the most significant factor in a woman’s 
participation in politics and becoming a candidate for office was a gendered culture, 
which influenced her self-perception. The authors described that the reluctance of women 
to become part of the political sphere was due to the impact of a “gendered psyche.”  
The “gendered psyche” is not a natural instinct for women, Lawless and Fox 
stated.  Rather, it is a social construction, produced by a number of social and 
psychological dynamics. These include a sexist environment, gender differences in 
defining political qualifications, and different yardsticks used by outside sources to gauge 
qualifications. One of the most inhibiting factors for women candidates is 
underestimating the worth of their own qualifications for office (Lawless & Fox, 2005, p. 
117). 
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Due to the embedded patterns of gender socialization, Lawless and Fox (2005) 
found elected office was a “much less likely” choice for women, no matter their 
credentials. “The enduring effects of traditional gender socialization that transcends all 
generations make sweeping increases in women’s numeric (political) representation 
unlikely,” they concluded (p. 149). In addition, women candidates have stagnated with 
the waning activism of the 1980s Women’s Movement, and the declining number of 
women 40-years-old or younger, who expressed interest in seeking political office.  
 Gender-based candidate recruitment. 
 Male dominance in politics and governance adds to a woman’s hesitation. 
Traditionally, political parties have acted as gatekeepers for potential candidates. This is 
true of both the Democrat and Republican parties, although women candidates more 
often run as Democrats (Lawless & Fox, 2005, pp. 83-85). Good, old boy networks, 
particularly the political parties, encourage men to seek office, as does the masculine 
ethos of the political world. Kira Sanbonmatsu (2006) came to similar conclusions while 
studying female candidacy and political parties.  Based on 2005 data gathered by the 
Council for American Women in Politics (CAWP), Sanbonmatsu focused on legislative 
elections in six case study states.  Like Lawless and Fox (2005), Sanbonmatsu found that 
the major political parties were important gatekeepers when soliciting potential 
candidates for office. 
 With few women office holders, there are few role models for women candidates 
to follow.  Nationally, 22.5% of all state legislators are women – only 9% in South 
Carolina. Therefore, male political networking dominated elections. Incumbency also 
played an important role in who gets elected. Studies indicated that 90% of incumbent 
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candidates are re-elected. With few women in legislative office, the strength of 
incumbency is another obstacle. Therefore, combining the dominance of men in state 
legislatures, the incumbency factor, and political party gatekeeping, women seeking 
legislative office face an uphill battle.  
 As Childs and Lovenduski (2013) wrote, the exclusion of women from politics “is 
ubiquitous, operated through layer upon layer of established male dominated institutions 
(not least, political parties) that are insulated by layer upon layer of formal and informal 
rules of exclusion” (p. 507). 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1 Methodological Orientation 
According to Michael Crotty (1998), the purpose and objectives of research 
should determine methods and methodology.  Whether a positivist approach or a 
constructivist approach is chosen, it is important that the methodology is consistently 
applied. Therefore, in selecting a research methodology, the aim of the research and the 
question to be explored is foundational. Like Crotty, Corrine Glesne (2006) agreed the 
purpose of the research required different approaches. The “predispositions” of 
quantitative and qualitative assist in determining the methodology chosen (p. 4). 
According to Glesne, the research purpose of quantitative methodology is 
predictions, causal explanations, and generalizability. Therefore, the researcher maintains 
an objective, detached role, as social variables are identified and measured. On the other 
hand, qualitative methodology aims for understanding, interpretation, and 
contextualization. As opposed to a quantitative approach, qualitative research makes 
minimal use of numerical indices, instead employs descriptive write-ups (p. 5). 
Harry F. Wolcott (1992) suggested that qualitative research methods should be 
thought of in “common everyday terms such as watching, asking, and what might be 
glossed as reviewing” (author’s emphasis, p. 19). Or, in more formal academic terms, 
observing, interviewing, and archival research.  
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Alan Peshkin (1993) further suggested that the outcomes of qualitative research 
can be broken down into four categories: description, interpretation, verification, and 
evaluation (p. 23). Peshkin further delineated these four categories into the outcomes of 
each approach. Of Peshkin’s four qualitative categories and their outcomes, descriptive 
analysis lent itself best to the aim of this case study. According to Peshkin, descriptive 
analysis seeks to uncover the processes, relationships, setting and situations, systems, and 
people. Also, descriptive analysis meshed well with Wolcott’s down-to-earth methods of 
watching, asking, and reviewing. 
This case study focused on the grassroots experiences of public education 
supporters and their participation in South Carolina’s 1984 school reform effort. 
Therefore, qualitative research methods were the best approach to explore citizens’ 
motivations to embrace a cause and act within their communities to build support.  
With this in mind, the tools open to qualitative researchers were the most 
productive method to gather data on the 1984 grassroots effort. These included interviews 
with participants, private and public documents, and archival material in the form of 
media coverage and opinion-editorial articles. These qualitative methods yielded a rich 
description of the 1984 EIA advocacy movement.  
3.2 Research Approach 
3.2.1 Case study. 
 Case study was the best approach to researching the 1984 EIA grassroots 
initiative because the case study approach results in an intensive study of a single unit for 
the purpose of understanding a larger class of similar units (Gerring, 2004).  It is a 
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“spatially bounded phenomenon” observed “at a single point of time or over some 
delimited period of time” (Gerring, 2004, p. 342).  
As to the definition of a unit, Gerring divided them into formal units and informal 
units. A formal unit “is the unit chosen for intensive analysis – the person, group, 
organization, county, region, country, or other bounded phenomenon of which the writer 
has in-depth knowledge” (p. 344). The details provided by these cases are in the form of 
field notes, he wrote, and a study with narrow boundaries would be “more conducive to 
case study analysis than a proposition with a broad purview” (p. 346). One of the distinct 
benefits of the case study method is the depth of analysis it provides. “One may think of 
depth as referring to the detail, richness, completeness, wholeness, or degree of variance 
that is accounted for by an explanation” (Gerring, 2004, p. 348). According to Gerring, 
case studies are contextual in that they help explain a unique, historical event. 
Uniqueness is one reason to select case study methodology. According to Robert 
E. Stake (1995), the “real business of case study is particularization. We take a particular 
case and come to know it well, not primarily as to how it is different from others, but 
what it is, what it does.” Case studies are not designed to produce generalizations, rather 
“the first emphasis is on understanding the case itself” (Stake, 1995, p.8). 
R.K. Yin (2009) called case studies the “preferred” method when exploring the 
“how” or “why” of the research questions, and when the case focused on contemporary 
experiences over which the researcher had no control (p.2). Critical to case study research 
is the use of “multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a 
triangulating fashion” (p. 2).  According to Yin, the rationale for conducting a single case 
study was that the circumstances are unique and the findings revelatory (2009, p. 48). 
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A case study of the 1984 EIA initiative fit the case study criteria. It was a clearly 
bounded case both by topic and timeline. The research itself was framed by “how” 
questions, particularly how the statewide initiative was organized, and how barriers were 
overcome. It was unique both in contemporary South Carolina political history, and in the 
approaches used by other southern governors during the school reform movement in the 
1980s. It revealed the tactics, motivations, realizations, and obstacles faced by organizers 
when building active public support at the local level without a coordinated, statewide 
organizational network to guide them. 
3.2.2 Study Context 
In explaining the logic of case study design, Yin (2009) stated the research aims 
for an  in-depth understanding of a real life phenomenon; however, the phenomenon must 
be understood within important contextual conditions, as these conditions are “highly 
pertinent” to the phenomenon of the study (p. 18). The complexity of any case study is 
“embedded in a number of contexts or backgrounds” (Stake, 2005, p. 449). These 
contexts may be historical, cultural, or physical, as well as social, economic, political, 
ethical, or aesthetic. The context, both political and economic, was fundamental to 
understanding the grassroots citizen mobilization in support of the 1984 EIA initiative. 
The context of this case was rooted in the call for public school reform, both by 
the National Commission on Excellence in Education’s 1983 A Nation At Risk report and 
the 1981 report The Need For Quality, issued by the Southern Regional Education Board 
(SREB). The SREB, an influential committee made up of southern governors, state 
legislators, and state education officials, began examining the impact of public education 
on economic development prior to the National Commission’s 1983 report. Publication of 
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A Nation At Risk bolstered the SREB’s report and fueled the priority status southern 
governors gave to school reform as the key to economic growth. 
In South Carolina, a 1980 political change strengthened the power of the 
governorship. South Carolina was, and continues to be, a legislature-dominated state with 
the state legislature controlling almost all aspects of policy making from budget 
allocations, appointments to state boards and commissions, election of judges, and 
control of local governments by a county’s legislative delegation.  
Further weakening the executive branch was the large number of elected 
statewide officials: lieutenant governor, secretary of state, treasurer, attorney general, 
comptroller general, education superintendent, adjutant general, and agriculture 
commissioner. While there were no term limits for members of the General Assembly or 
for statewide elected officials, South Carolina governors constitutionally were limited to 
one four-year term. 
This changed in 1980 when Gov. Riley with the help of progressive legislators 
campaigned for a change in the S.C. Constitution, which would allow a governor a 
second successive term. In a statewide referendum, the constitutional amendment was 
passed, and when Riley was reelected in November 1982, he became South Carolina’s 
first governor to serve for eight consecutive years from 1979 to 1987.  “This victory had 
enormous implications for strengthening the governor’s role in public policy-making. No 
longer was he simply a ‘personality’ occupying office, now he was governor for eight 
years, a period long enough to propose and implement programs” (Carter & Young, n.d.). 
In addition, a governor’s reelection campaign could serve as a platform for a second term 
political agenda, tacitly implying approval by the voters if the governor was re-elected. 
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The 1980 change in the state Constitution coincided with the regional and national 
call for school reform. With Riley’s active promotion of  school improvement during his 
first term, the election to a second term allowed him to continue placing public education 
as a top priority. This set the groundwork for developing the EIA and organizing the 
grassroots voter support necessary to pass the reform proposal and its tax increase 
funding during a legislative election year. 
3.3 Participant Selection 
The criteria for those invited to take part in this case study was their first-hand 
knowledge and personal participation in the planning and implementation of the strategy 
to engage grassroots support for the EIA.  These included: 
 Former S.C. Governor and U.S. Secretary of Education Richard W. Riley 
 Dr. Terry Peterson, education advisor to the Governor and U.S. Secretary of 
Education 
  Bill Prince, political director during the Riley gubernatorial administration 
 William Youngblood, Jr., chairman of the Business-Partnership Committee 
 Former S.C. Senator Harry Chapman, chairman of the S.C. Senate Education 
Committee 
 Vivian Watson, former president of the S.C. Education Association 
 Dr. Elizabeth Gressette, former executive director of the Palmetto State Teachers 
Association 
 Joe Grant, former legislative lobbyist for the S.C. Education Association 
 Dr. Larry Winecoff and Dr. Conrad Powell, forum organizers 
 Dr. Chester Floyd, retired school district superintendent 
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3.4 Data Collection Methods 
 According to Harry F. Wolcott (1992), qualitative research is based on three 
information gathering techniques: experiencing, enquiring, and examining. Robert Stake 
(2005) suggested that multiple data collection methods increased an accurate 
interpretation of the case studied. This “redundancy of data collection” is termed 
triangulation, which is “the process of using multiple perceptions to clarify meaning, 
verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” (R. Stake, 2005, p. 454). 
Robert K. Yin (2009) explained this approach as validity construction. To 
construct case study validity, Yin recommended three methods: using multiple sources of 
evidence, establishing a chain of evidence, and have “key informants” review the draft of 
the case study (p. 41). These strategies result in “converging lines of inquiry,” thereby 
making the study more accurate as different sources of information provide corroboration 
of the findings (Yin, p. 116). 
3.4.1 Interviews. 
To further the search for understanding, qualitative researchers separate what is 
happening in “key episodes or testimonies” from those “presenting these episodes with 
their own interpretation and narratives” (R.E. Stake, 1995, p. 40). Qualitative research 
uses narratives “to optimize the opportunity of the reader to gain experiential 
understanding of the case.” 
Along with the careful selection of those who could provide rich details of their 
experiences with the EIA movement, open-ended questions were used to explore their 
narratives. As previously noted in the discussion of case study and qualitative research 
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methods, these questions sought information as to the “what” and “how” of the 
interviewee’s experience. 
 Specific interview questions included: 
1) How were you or your organization involved in the strategy to build support for 
passage of the 1984 S.C. Education Improvement Act? 
2) What strategies did you or your organization employ to build educator, 
legislative, business, and citizen support for passage of the legislation? 
3) What obstacles did you or your organization encounter when organizing and 
implementing this support effort? 
4) In your opinion, what was the most effective strategy used to win legislative 
approval? 
5) In your opinion, what was the impact of citizen engagement on passage of the 
legislation? 
Follow-up questions were used to encourage the interviewee to expand on his or her 
observations. The interviews were conducted at a place and time convenient to the 
participant. 
Interview requests were made by email. When requesting an interview, the 
participants were informed that the session would be digitally recorded and later 
transcribed by the researcher. Interviewees also were advised in writing that information 
or opinions expressed during the interview might be directly quoted and attributed to 
them by name as part of the written dissertation. These stipulations were repeated in 
follow-up confirmation emails.  
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In order to verify the accuracy of a quotation and its context, each participant was 
given the opportunity to read and comment on the section or sections of the case study in 
which they were quoted. Specifically, each was asked to examine the section to ensure 
the accuracy of the quotation and interpretation of their comments. This member 
checking was essential to the validity of the researcher’s understanding and presentation 
of the interviewees’ statements.  
 By return email, the participants either approved their statements as accurate or 
edited the section to better reflect their thinking. If there were corrections, the changes 
were copied into the dissertation document with no alternation by the researcher. The 
member checking protocol and digital recordings of the interviews were used to ensure 
the accuracy of the narratives, reflections, and opinions of the participants interviewed.  
3.4.2 Document collection. 
In addition to in-depth interviews, both public and private documents were an 
important source of the research findings. Collected data included the examination of 
news accounts, public documents, business and association communications, and public 
relations material used during the EIA initiative. Most of the documents examined were 
from the Riley gubernatorial administration files, housed at the S.C. Department of 
Archives and History. Additional articles and documents were accessed through public or 
academic databases.  
The private papers of some interviewees were made available for this case study. 
These included internal memoranda, organizational charts, drafts of speeches, press 
releases, publicity literature, videotapes, background information, and personal written 
reflections.  
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Document review is an important facet of triangulation. Public documents are 
valuable to qualitative research methods because they can contribute a more objective 
account of events, as well as fill in faulty or faded memories of interview participants. 
According to Stake (1995), documents can serve as “substitutes” for activities the 
researcher could not observe directly. Additionally, documents may provide more precise 
information than either the case study participants or the researcher can. This was true in 
researching this case study. 
To support objectivity in the research and findings, news accounts and editorials from 
1983 through 1984 were used. These news accounts and editorials were from South 
Carolina’s daily and weekly newspapers and some out-of-state newspapers, such as The 
Charlotte Observer, The New York Times, and The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. Since 
most newspapers in the 1980s had morning and afternoon editions, each edition from the 
same city had separate reporters and editorial boards. This allowed a wide variety of 
reporting perspectives on the EIA.  
While some news articles were found through electronic databases, most were 
found in copies of the Governor’s News Summary from the Riley administration files at 
state Archives. (Richard W. Riley Gubernatorial Papers (1979-1987). News Summaries. 
(S554026, July 1983– September 1984). South Carolina Department of Archives and 
History, Columbia S.C. Retrieved July 24, 2014 – October 15, 2014.)  
The news summaries were produced daily by members of the Riley Press Office, 
including the researcher, from daily and weekly newspapers and distributed to the 
governor and senior staff members. All articles and editorials on local, state, and national 
issues were included in the summaries, whether or not they reflected positively or 
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negatively on the Riley administration. The news summaries were a valuable research 
source for this case study for three reasons. 
First, articles included in the summaries were not limited to public education but 
focused on important local, state, and national issues, giving greater context to the EIA 
effort. Next, the summaries included articles from newspapers no longer readily 
accessible in print or digital format. Third, the articles provided objective content for the 
study, particularly the editorials and op-ed columns. 
Providing a negative case analysis was essential to this study, not only to balance 
information from the interviewees, but also to counteract the researcher’s subjectivity 
while researching and writing the case study. Early in the research, it became apparent 
that locating and interviewing individuals to support a negative case analysis would be 
difficult. Because the EIA reform movement is over three decades ago, many of the 
opposing key legislators and businessmen are dead. In addition, some interviewees 
declined to be interviewed, citing faulty memories of the period. Therefore, the news 
articles and editorials provided an important counterbalance to interviews of EIA 
supporters, as well as questions regarding the researcher’s trustworthiness. 
3.4.3 Historical/Contextual Research  
 Historical context adds to the understanding of case study phenomenon. As 
previously noted, academic articles, government reports, political studies, media accounts 
of the 1980 national public education reform movement and school improvement 
activities of southern governors were examined for this case study. School improvement 
efforts in other southern states were useful when contrasting the lobbying efforts and 
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reform proposals advanced by other southern governors to Riley’s grassroots 
mobilization approach. 
3.5 Data Analysis 
3.5.1 Individual case analysis. 
When creating a case study database, Yin (2009) recommended that the case 
study “should have enough data to allow the reader an independent judgment,” thereby, 
increasing the study’s reliability (p. 119). A case study database should consist of 
documents and narratives developed by open-ended interview questions. 
To maintain the reliability of the data, Yin stated that a chain of evidence should 
be maintained to allow the reader to trace back through the study’s evidence after reading 
the conclusion (p.122). This audit trail should consist of actual written case notes, 
transcriptions, and corroborating documents. Also, there must be sufficient citations to 
strengthen the claim of reliability through triangulation. 
Qualitative case study data analysis is based on the sociological tradition of 
thematic analysis, which involves coding the gathered data around themes, then 
separating the coding into data “clumps” for further analysis (Glesne, 2006). These 
generic categories can be people, dates, events, interview narratives, and documents. 
Through this initial coding exercise, theme consistencies should emerge. 
Preliminary coding of the interview transcripts can be further examined through 
in vivo coding to maintain the authentic voices of those interviewed. When using the in 
vivo coding method, specific verbatim phrases are lifted from transcribed interviews. 
This results in numerous phrase codes essential to revealing theme patterns from the 
interviews.  
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Throughout the coding process, Glesne (2006) recommended the researcher write 
research memos about what is seen in the data, no matter how preliminary the coding 
may be. “The comments and thoughts recorded in field log entries as memos are links 
across your data that find their way into analytic files” (p. 148). In addition, Glesne 
endorsed reflexive memos to monitor subjectivity, keeping the researcher “attuned to the 
outlook that shapes your data analysis” (p. 148).  
3.5.2 Interview coding methods. 
Following Glesne’s advice (2006) that noting possible themes cannot begin too 
early, transcribing the interviews of my participants generated potential coding categories 
from the beginning. The six interview questions served as broad categories under which 
potential themes were organized. These overarching, question-based categories were: 
initial strategies, organizing strategies, citizen engagement, sustaining momentum, most 
effective engagement strategy, and citizen impact. As potential themes emerged from the 
interviews, they were organized under the six broad categories. 
The use of in vivo coding was the first method used to analyze each transcript. 
Pertinent quotes were either paraphrased or directly quoted in a comment to the side of 
the written transcript.  The in vivo comments were analyzed, then classified under the six 
broad question-based categories. Once classified, the comment would be reduced into an 
abbreviated theme. For instance, an interview quote might fall under the “initial strategy” 
category. This comment would be coded “Initial,” followed by a code of not more than 
four words. 
After the transcripts were coded by broad categories, in vivo comments, and 
narrower theme, each category code was transferred to an Excel spreadsheet, which listed 
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the interviewee, the in vivo comment, and the abbreviated theme. Since each spreadsheet 
was limited to one of the six question categories, the spreadsheets served to confirm or 
expand themes and to expose additional themes.   
3.5.3 Document coding methods 
As previously described, broad subject categories were used when coding 
interviews for the case study. These same broad categories were applied to the media 
articles, archival documents, and EIA correspondence and memorandum from the Riley 
gubernatorial files. In addition to articles, reports, and memoranda gathered from private 
collections, over 640 news articles, editorials, op-ed columns, and letters to the editor 
relating to the EIA reform effort were examined. Also studied were archival documents 
from EIA support groups, as well as Riley’s EIA correspondence. 
After summarizing each news article by month, the article summaries were 
divided into categories based on subject area. Included were categories on educator 
response, public participation, polling, regional forums, opposition groups, pro and con 
editorials, southern school reform, among others. Dividing the article summaries by 
subject facilitated analysis when comparing information from the news articles and 
editorials to information from interviews and other documents.   
3.5.4 Memo writing 
Potential themes and connections to theory became apparent from the beginning 
of the transcription process. Using the interview questions as a guideline, I kept 
handwritten notes of repetitive themes as they appeared in the interviews. After 
transcribing all interviews, I began reviewing my interview memos for recurring themes 
and connections to my theoretical framework. Although some of the preliminary themes 
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noted in the memos did not hold up under the more detailed data analysis, they served to 
organize my thinking, allowed a preview to possible thematic codes, as well as a valuable 
preliminary alignment with theory. 
3.6 Methodological Considerations 
3.6.1 Trustworthiness. 
 Validity of the research cannot be considered at the end of the study, it must be 
considered every step of the way (Glesne, 2006). She cited J.W. Creswell’s (1998) eight 
verification procedures as pertinent to case study research: prolonged engagement and 
persistent observation; peer review and debriefing; triangulation; negative case analysis; 
clarification of the researcher’s bias; member checking; thick, rich description, and 
external audit (p. 37). Although Glesne said that all eight of the procedures are not 
necessary to ensure the trustworthiness of a study, they are important to consider during 
research undertakings (p. 38). 
Yin (2009) stated that the validity of a qualitative study should be like an audit 
trail. The reader of the study should be able to trace the researcher’s conclusions cited 
through the interviews, documents, field notes, and analysis memos written during the 
research process. This should result in a convergence of the evidence, so that conclusions 
are not based on singular, linear findings -- for example, from participant interviews only 
or public documents only. By carefully citing a broad variation of evidence, the audit trail 
is established and can be verified by an outside source. 
 Triangular protocols should be a search for additional meaning, rather than just a 
single viewpoint (Stake, 1995). Therefore, multiple interviews, member checking, 
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document research, and outside reader review can result in many different interpretations 
to be considered by the researcher. 
 In building triangulation for this case study, I used the practices described above. 
Multiple interviews were conducted with participants. The interviewees reviewed the 
documents for accurate quotations and correct interpretations. Numerous news articles 
were read, summarized and categorized to provide an objective history of the EIA 
initiative. A wide array of public and private documents were examined, and when taken 
together with the interviews and news articles, provided a detailed, description of the 
effort. From the beginning, research memos were kept to track possible themes, theory 
connections, or issues needing further investigation. A great deal of help was given by 
members of my dissertation committee, regarding data gathering and organization, as 
well as the best use of qualitative research methods. 
Ultimately, I followed Wolcott’s (1992) advice to qualitative researchers: when in 
doubt “tell the truth” (p. 44). Although this sounds simplistic, it served as valuable 
guidance when researching and writing this case study. As Wolcott (1992, p. 44) 
counseled: 
 “Tell what you saw (and asked about and saw in the works of others)” 
 Maintain “an objective eye for your own objectivity” 
 Describe your data collection methods accurately and adequately in an 
understandable, straight-forward manner 
 In the same manner, explain the ideas that guided your research, and how they 
may have altered in the course of the research 
 Describe the role of theory. 
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Taken together, Wolcott’s methods were drawn upon throughout  this case study and 
support its trustworthiness. 
3.6.2 Role of the researcher. 
As previously established, my interest in this case study arose from my own 
experiences with South Carolina school policy-making as a Statehouse journalist, a staff 
member in the Riley administration, a public school teacher, and as an education policy 
advocate.  In one light, these experiences over a 30 year period can be seen as valuable in 
understanding the political context and historical timeline as it relates to this study. 
However, these experiences also call into question my subjectivity as the researcher. 
Citing the definition of “subjectivity” in Webster’s Third New International 
Dictionary, Alan Peshkin (1988) wrote that subjectivity is the quality of the investigator 
that may affect the outcome of an investigation. Peshkin believed subjectivity arose in all 
aspects of the research process, but of importance was the systematic acknowledgement 
of this fact by the researcher during the course of the study. At the very least, Peshkin 
(1988) stated that researchers should “disclose to their readers where self and subject 
became joined” (p.17).  
Having experienced subjectivity bias in his own research, Peshkin (1988)  
recommended researchers audit their research, looking for “Subjective I’s.” He wrote, 
“By monitoring myself, I can create an illuminating, empowering, personal statement that 
attunes me to where self and subject are intertwined” (1988, p. 20). 
 Adopting Peshkin’s approach, there were a number of “Subjective I’s” I 
monitored during this case study. One was my “Personal Investment I.” Having been 
closely involved in the EIA initiative, it would be to my personal advantage to convey it 
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in the most flattering light. Some of the EIA’s messages were crafted through my writing 
under the guidance of Riley’s education and political advisors. Understandably, I am 
proud of this involvement. However, knowing a sense of personal achievement must be 
checked, I was particularly thorough when examining records and documents that gave 
the most unbiased approach or a contrary stance. 
These articles, particularly the editorials, were used extensively throughout the 
case study to counterbalance the impression that the Riley plan had no opposition or any 
tension among the supporting groups. I specifically included articles and documents to 
serve as a negative case analysis, particularly since it proved difficult to interview 
staunch opponents of the EIA plan, as previously explained.  
Most opposition to the EIA was directed at the one cent sales tax increase and the 
proposed increase in teacher pay.  Internally, tension between the two teacher 
associations also occurred. In writing this case study, I specifically included statements 
from opposition groups and negative editorials written about the tax increase and the 
proposed teacher pay. In addition, the obstacles section of the Findings chapter 
specifically addressed these issues.     
 My “Legacy I” also could be a possible source of  bias. The “Legacy I” would be 
my tendency to maintain and bolster the reputation and achievements of a public elected 
official I admire and those who assisted him. I was especially cognizant of this when 
interviewing the participants in this case study. My experience as a former journalist 
assisted in asking follow-up questions to yield better, more detailed explanations. Also, 
having read 15 months of media articles on the EIA, I was able to focus the interviews on 
the details of the EIA efforts, especially questioning the obstacles that arose. 
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 During the researching and writing of this case study, I was very aware of my 
various subjectivities. Consequently, I may have avoided using some articles, editorials, 
op-ed columns, or national comments praising the role played by Gov. Riley or the 
achievements of the EIA.  This was done under an abundance of caution and may be 
criticized by those who witnessed and supported the campaign and public engagement 
endeavor.  
Due to my concerns about the current state of public education in South Carolina, 
I also was conscious of my “Activist/Political I.”  In order to mitigate that stance, I 
limited data collection to 1983 through 1984, the specific years of the EIA effort. Also 
excluded were any interview questions seeking the opinions of participants regarding 
current state school policy or politics. In a like manner, there were no individuals 
interviewed who did not participate directly in the EIA reform movement. 
As a former journalist, I consciously relied on my ability to record, question, 
analyze, and write objectively throughout this case study and strove to maintain “an 
objective eye for your own objectivity,” as Wolcott stated (1992, p. 44). 
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CHAPTER 4 
FINDINGS 
This case study describes the construction of an unprecedented statewide citizen network 
to actively promote passage of Gov. Dick Riley’s signature school reform bill before the 
S.C. General Assembly. This chapter examines how the grassroots effort was built and 
legislative passage accomplished with research gathered from interviews, published and 
internal staff documents, archival material, news accounts, and editorials. 
Construction of any project requires a specific plan, following a logical 
progression of steps. Building a grassroots network from the ground up is no different. So 
it was with Riley’s EIA proposal. Activities were deliberately designed to activate a 
statewide citizen support network aimed at pressuring the state Legislature to enact the 
reform plan and a one cent sales tax increase. Methodical planning of this grassroots 
effort was particularly important because no such voter-based statewide network existed 
in South Carolina. Strong, active citizen engagement would be critical in a legislative 
election year. 
To investigate the process of building the EIA grassroots movement, I used a 
chronological approach in the interviews.  To present the findings that emerged, I 
employed a thematic approach.  The questions and themes addressed were: 
1. Initial strategies for passage of the EIA 
2. Organizing the grassroots lobbying effort 
3. Engaging citizen support throughout the state  
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4. Sustaining grassroots lobbying through the legislative session 
5. Obstacles encountered in building and sustaining citizen activism 
6. The most effective lobbying strategies 
7. The impact of citizen engagement on the bill’s passage. 
These broad themes arose from the interview transcripts, as well as news articles and 
other documents published during the time the EIA effort was planned and executed. 
4.1 Initial Strategies for Passage of the Education Improvement Act of 1984 
 Planning for the EIA effort began in the summer of 1983 in the aftermath of a 
legislative defeat. During the 1983 session, the Legislature faced a significant budget 
deficit, resulting from an economic downturn. Riley proposed an increase in the state’s 4 
cents sales tax to be divided between public education and property tax relief. This split 
funding approach did not attract enough legislative support and failed to win passage. 
 Lessons learned from that unsuccessful attempt helped shape the strategy for the 
next push for education reform. Riley and his senior staff designed a three-pronged plan 
deemed critical to the successful passage and funding of the new school reform initiative. 
These three elements were: to actively engage the public in the effort, to focus the role of 
the governor on one issue, and to build statewide momentum generated by the nationwide 
education reform movement. This section discusses these three components. 
 4.1.1 Public involvement. 
 Any election significantly raises the profile of the winning candidate, and this was 
true of Dick Riley. However, the November 1982 election of Dick Riley was particularly 
notable because Riley was South Carolina’s first two-term governor. In 1980, a statewide 
referendum amended the state Constitution to allow a governor to serve two consecutive 
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four year terms. The election of the first two-term governor not only raised Riley’s public 
profile, generating a statewide coalition of campaign supporters, but also gave Riley an 
additional four years to complete his legislative agenda.  
 The agenda of Riley’s first term was not limited to addressing the persistently low 
national rankings of South Carolina’s schools, but also pressing environmental and health 
issues. Disposal of out-of-state nuclear and hazardous waste was persistent in South 
Carolina, which was labeled the nation’s “dumping ground.”  Also important to Riley 
were health care issues plaguing the poor, particularly the state’s high rate of infant 
mortality. 
While these issues had devoted supporters, none had the same potential for 
statewide public interest as school reform. Riley’s legislative efforts during the 1983 
legislative session already had given the issue prominence. Reports, such as A Nation At 
Risk, generated national discussions linking economic growth to better public schools.  
In the aftermath of the governor’s 1983 school reform defeat, Riley’s senior 
assistants decided the best path to success was not just coordinating support from 
established Statehouse education lobbyists, but also building a statewide citizen network 
to promote the need for improvement in their community schools with their legislators. 
This public grassroots network would not just include educators, but also parents and 
community leaders, who recognized the connection between good schools, good jobs, 
and good community quality of life. 
In the summer of 1983, top aides to Gov. Riley determined that strong public 
involvement would be key to pressuring the General Assembly to act on education 
reform. Although South Carolina is a legislatively-dominated state, the governor could 
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use the “bully pulpit” of his office to promote the issue, combining it with an effective 
coalition of political supporters, educators, and the voting public.  
This coalition is what Riley education advisor Terry Peterson labeled a 
“grassroots/grass tops” strategy, building strength from the bottom up and the top down 
with both groups having significant input (personal communication, September 4, 2015). 
Despite the grass tops element, this effort is widely considered a “grassroots model.” 
Political scientist William Chance (1986) described this engagement strategy as the “T-
formation,” with the governor, state superintendent of education and the Legislature at 
the top of the T, drawing up activism from local coalitions of educators, community 
leaders, business interests, and an active public (p. 33). Chance (1986) stated that the 
“most important dynamic for the vertical coalition was downward through 
implementation councils to convey and interpret the state policy initiatives to the 
localities” (p. 33). 
 Involving the public  in the legislative process was a new approach for the Riley 
administration. However, to build the kind of constituent pressure needed to convince the 
General Assembly that school improvement and funding were needed, mobilizing voters 
was critical. To foster sustained engagement, it would be necessary for the public “to take 
ownership of it.” 
You would make the policy itself strong, and you would make the public 
grassroots effort stronger. So, from day one, we structured a whole strategy that 
the public was going to be involved not only in lobbying, but we were going to 
involve them in the actual recommendations, and getting their input. (B. Prince, 
personal communication, August 5, 2015) 
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This strategy – encouraging citizen input and ownership -- would become important 
building blocks of the EIA grassroots movement.  
 4.1.2 The role of the governor. 
With the need for widespread public engagement, Gov. Riley’s high profile 
participation in the passage of school reform legislation was vital to activating and 
sustaining citizen involvement.  
 In the summer of 1983, the role Riley would assume was developed by two senior 
staff members, political director Bill Prince and legislative liaison Dwight Drake. 
Promoting the EIA would be a campaign-like effort with sole focus on the school reform 
bill.  They believed it was essential that the governor give his full attention to the reform 
plan as it was developed, promoted, and pushed in the Legislature. 
 Following the summer meeting of the Education Commission of the States (ECS), 
Drake and Prince wrote an internal memorandum to Riley. The July 25, 1983 memo 
outlined what would be required of the governor and his staff if a school reform plan was 
to be successful during the following legislative session.  Labeling it a “plan of action,” 
the two senior staff members wrote that it would “take a commitment and effort far 
beyond anything we have done since you have been in office” (D. Drake and B. Prince, 
personal communication, July 25, 1983.  Copy in possession of Terry Peterson). 
 Prior to the memo, Riley had established two blue ribbon committees to examine 
the education needs of the state. One was the Partnership among Business/Industry, the 
Legislature and the Public Schools. Comprised of influential business leaders and 
legislators, it was chaired by Riley and S.C. Superintendent of Education Charlie 
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Williams. The committee’s task was to oversee school improvement recommendations 
and promote them with the business community.  
The governor assigned a more specific job to the Committee on Financing 
Excellence in the Public Schools, chaired by Greenville, S.C. financier William Page. 
This group would draft a school reform plan and determine a way to fund it. This 
committee report would be the groundwork of Riley’s recommendations to the General 
Assembly. 
However, in order to secure legislative approval for reform legislation and its 
funding, Drake and Prince recommended that the governor’s office “mount an intensive 
campaign in support of improved public schools. Our overall goal is to build public 
support, which will ultimately translate into legislative support” (D. Drake and B. Prince, 
personal communication, July 25, 1983). 
Drake and Prince’s first “and most important” recommendation made to Riley 
was “a commitment by you that virtually all of your time for the next nine months will be 
spent on education” (personal communication, July 25, 1983). The aim was to make 
Riley “a kind of one-note Johnny” for school improvement (B. Prince, personal 
communication, August 5, 2015). 
The memo also recommended that the governor ask his staff to support his sole 
focus stance and “to shoulder a greater burden during the coming months” by handling 
issues other than education “without involving you or taking up your time” (D. Drake and 
B. Prince, personal communication, July 25, 1983). The decision to limit Riley’s time and 
energy specifically to school reform created some tension among the governor’s staff  
members since it relegated other state-level issues to the backburner for a year. With 
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some reluctance, gubernatorial aides accepted this single-minded strategy, understanding 
their policy issues would receive much less attention from Riley. 
Riley’s singular focus on school reform became evident to the media prior to 
recommendations from the two Blue Ribbon committees or the formal announcements of 
public forums to build citizen support. “In recent months, Riley has increased his efforts 
in public education, making a pitch for improvements in nearly every public statement” 
(Sayles, 1982, August 24, p. 8C). This local focus aligned with a broader national trend.   
4.1.3 National education reform movement. 
The plan to build public momentum for improving South Carolina’s low ranking 
public schools was boosted by the national discussion surrounding the impact of 
education on economic growth.  The conclusion of the National Commission on 
Excellence in Education’s 1983 report A Nation At Risk: The Imperative for Educational 
Reform captured the country’s attention. The commission claimed that America’s 
economic prosperity was threatened by an increasingly mediocre public school system 
and the students it produced. As an example, the report pointed to the booming economy 
of Japan and the wide academic achievement gap between Japanese and American 
students.  
A Nation At Risk couched its conclusions in economic terms. Consequently, both 
business and education felt the urgency for reform. In addition to A Nation At Risk, the 
U.S. Department of Education also issued a report on the ten states with the lowest per 
pupil funding, linking low funding with the highest national dropout rates and the lowest 
college entrance examination scores. Seven of the ten were in the South, including South 
Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia and Mississippi. At that 
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time, South Carolina ranked 47
th
 in high school graduation rates, 44
th
 in teacher salaries, 
and 43
rd
 in per pupil funding. 
Despite the stir caused by both reports, neither the federal government nor 
national commissions led the charge for change. It was the states, and more significantly, 
the southern states. Concern among governors in the South did not arise solely from the 
1983 federal reports. There were prior school improvement studies, many of which came 
from state-based task forces. Among these were the ECS’ 1983 report Action For 
Excellence and the Southern Regional Education Board’s (SREB) 1981 study The Need 
For Quality.  
The SREB report built a sense of urgency among southern governors. States in the 
Deep South consistently ranked in the bottom ten in high school graduation rates, teacher 
pay, per pupil funding, and test scores. Reinforcing the dismal education rankings were 
equally poor wage levels, job creation, and low per capita income rankings. “I think the 
South is further ahead in proposing education reform because they are the furthest 
behind,” said Mark Musick, SREB executive director (Schmidt, W.E., 1984, January 11, 
p. 1A, 9A). Consequently, school improvement already was at the top of many 
gubernatorial priority lists. 
As reported in The New York Times, the southern states were devising school 
improvements plans more than any other region in the country (Schmidt, 1984, January 
11, p. 1A, 9A).  Most of these proposals called for sales tax increases, the education 
funding method most used by southern states. This was true in South Carolina with Riley 
proposing a sales tax increase from 4 to 5 cents to pay for school improvements. In 
Arkansas, the legislature paid for Governor Bill Clinton’s school reform plan by 
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increasing the state’s 3 cents sales tax to 4 cents, the largest tax increase in Arkansas’ 
history. After two legislative defeats, Tennessee Governor Lamar Alexander’s Better 
Schools program raised the state’s sales tax from 4.5 percent to 5.4 percent.  
Southern governors also called their state Legislatures into special sessions to 
pressure lawmakers to act on school reform. This tactic was used by Alexander, Florida 
Governor Robert Graham, and Mississippi Governor William Winter. To add urgency to 
William’s push for action on his education plan, he called the special legislative session 
right before Christmas in December 1982, an approach that led to quick legislative 
approval after two prior defeats. 
Due to his early efforts at school reform, Winter was considered the “vanguard” of 
southern education reform governors (Hansen, 1984, January 22, p.6S). Mississippi was 
at the bottom of every national education list, as well every economic indicator. When 
Winter learned that a company rejected locating in Mississippi because executives feared 
the state could not produce enough skilled workers due to its low education rankings, the 
governor launched his 1980 school improvement initiative (Hansen, 1984, January 22). 
 The Winter strategy was to gain business support by linking economic 
development with better schools. Educators were brought on board with the promise of 
increased funding and pay raises. To gain public support for passage, Winter and his wife 
Elise traveled throughout Mississippi, conducting nine citizen forums to convince the 
public of the need for school improvement and the taxes to fund it. It was “not unlike 
conducting a political campaign” (Hansen, 1984, January 22, p. 6S).  
 Acknowledging the power of citizen involvement to overcome legislators’ 
reluctance, Riley adopted the William Winter school campaign strategy as he planned a 
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new push for school improvement following the 1983 legislative defeat of his reform 
proposal. 
4.1.4 Lessons from Mississippi 
As the 1983 session wound down, Riley and his senior staff began planning for 
the 1984 legislative foray for education. With governors across the South struggling with 
legislatures to reform and fund public education, there were lessons to be learned from 
their successes and failures. At the close of the 1983 session, Riley and his senior staff 
contacted the Mississippi Governor’s Office to discuss the Winter strategy.  
 It took the Mississippi governor three attempts to pass his reform bill, which 
proposed statewide kindergarten, compulsory education, teacher pay raises, and student 
testing among other improvements. Funding came from a one cent sales tax increase and 
raises in corporate and individual taxes. It was the largest tax hike in Mississippi’s 
history. However, success was not achieved until public activism pressured state 
lawmakers to pass the reforms and tax increases. The necessity of citizen engagement 
was crucial advice that Winter passed on to Riley. 
 Traveling to Jackson, Mississippi, Riley’s education advisor Terry Peterson and 
legislative liaison Dwight Drake met with Winter’s advisors, who offered hard-earned 
lessons from their school reform battles with Mississippi lawmakers. While the 
campaign-like approach had succeeded, Winter’s staff described what they believed were 
fundamental mistakes made when first initiating the effort. The most critical was lack of 
public involvement in developing the proposal. 
With statewide kindergarten the centerpiece of the proposal, the governor’s office 
brought together early childhood experts and other educators to devise the plan. 
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According to Peterson, “They said if you’re going to do something big, don’t go out with 
a canned plan until you get lots and lots of input from people” (personal communication, 
September 3, 2015). 
Because the school plan was put together by the governor’s staff, the State 
Department of Education, and academic experts, the public felt little ownership of the 
proposal. “The local people, the local teachers, parents might have liked kindergarten, but 
they had no input into what the kindergarten proposal was going to look like. People felt 
like the state leaders were jamming it down the local’s throats because the proposal was 
already put together, even though they liked their state leaders” (T. Peterson, personal 
communication, September 4, 2015). 
The Mississippi experience cemented the importance of public input from the 
beginning. This established the underlying philosophy of the Riley reform effort – public 
ownership would lead to public activism. 
4.2   Organizing the Grassroots Lobbying Effort 
As with any campaign, Riley prepared a very specific plan to build momentum for his 
school legislation before directly asking for citizen support at the seven regional forums 
planned for the fall. Traditional campaign methods were organized, such as launching a 
speaker’s bureau, encouraging media coverage of the two Blue Ribbon Committees 
developing reform recommendations, and the production of “canned” speeches and press 
releases for use by supporters. 
Beyond the more traditional methods, the plan also included political tactics usually 
reserved for an election campaign. These included a public opinion poll on education 
conducted in July, a November statewide television address by Riley to explain his 
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school improvement proposal, and professionally produced television commercials, 
urging people to contact their legislators in support of school reform and funding. 
However, laying the groundwork for citizen engagement from the grass tops to the 
grassroots was fundamental to the two-pronged campaign strategy.  
4.2.1 Grass tops/grassroots organization design. 
Chance (1986) labeled it the “T-formation.” Riley’s education advisor called it a 
“grass tops, grassroots” strategy (T. Peterson, personal communication, September 4, 
2015). Both terms described a support-building mechanism, designed to maximize buy-in 
from stakeholders from the top down and the bottom up. 
You’ve got to have a broad structure of people at the top and the bottom. But they 
have to be feeding information and strategies to each other back and forth. So the 
grass tops don’t think they’re out there by themselves on the one hand, but they also 
can stimulate action at the grassroots. And the grassroots feel like they have some 
connection to the statewide action. They can either reach their members or the effort 
(T. Peterson, personal communication, September 4, 2015). 
As Mississippi’s experience demonstrated, bringing all stakeholders together for input 
was important before presenting a school reform plan to the public. These stakeholders 
were the “grass tops,” a wide array of public school supporters, who could use their 
contacts and lend their networks if afforded the opportunity to shape the proposal. 
Known as the Blue Ribbon Committee on Financing Excellence in Education, its 
charge was to hammer out the school reform plan and the method to fund it. Chaired by 
Riley and businessman Bill Page, this statewide task force was a diverse group of 
legislators, teachers, administrators, school board and parent associations, local chambers 
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of commerce, attorneys, business and civic leaders. Each had a constituency and an 
established network of contacts, important to sustaining future public activism.  
Although there were many educators on the task force, the diversity was notable. One 
teacher said that when attending the first meeting, she looked around the table and 
thought it would be “a miracle” if the group could settle on a place for lunch, much less 
develop a unified school reform plan. (E. Gressette, personal communication, March 3, 
2015). However, the variety of viewpoints would serve as a sounding board for potential 
legislative objections raised against the proposal. As one education lobbyist said, “You 
had to invite everybody because you couldn’t afford to have anybody on the outside 
throwing rocks” (J. Grant, personal communication, July 23, 2015) 
The initial framework for the committee’s work was the “New Approach to Quality 
Education,” a 41-point school improvement plan developed by the S.C. Department of 
Education. S.C. Superintendent Charlie Williams, a statewide elected official, had 
presented the 41-point plan to education, business, and civic organizations before Riley 
formed his blue ribbon committees.  However, business people and some of educators 
wanted a more comprehensive proposal. Consequently, they asked Peterson to combine 
recommendations from the “New Approach” with reform strategies proposed by the ECS 
and the SREB. 
Even with the combined “New Approach,” ECS, and SREB plans as the blueprint, 
reaching consensus on the recommendations would be a difficult, but critical, effort if the 
committee was to present a united voice in support of its final proposals. Also, without 
consensus, the valuable network each member brought to the committee could be lost. 
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One example of difficult task force debates concerned teacher pay raises, which 
ultimately became a central selling point for the reform plan.  
At that time, South Carolina’s teacher pay was ranked 49th in the country.  The 
committee recommended increasing salaries to the Southeastern average; they reasoned 
that otherwise good teachers might move to surrounding states that had already raised 
salaries. However, business representatives insisted on accountability measures, such as 
exit exams, greater teacher accountability attached to merit pay, and a possible business 
oversight committee.  
The S.C. Education Association (SCEA) balked. Not only did the teacher group argue 
for salaries at the national level, but also had concerns that too many accommodations 
might be made to business in order to maintain its support for the reform plan’s funding 
(Norton, 1983, September 18).  
Of the two teacher associations, the SCEA had the greatest membership. With 20,000 
working and retired teachers, the politically active SCEA represented the state’s largest 
education communication network, which would be valuable to igniting grassroots level 
support. At that time, the Palmetto State Teachers Association (PSTA) was a fledging 
organization with about a thousand members. While it supported school reform, PSTA 
members were not actively involved in politics.  South Carolina was one of the only 
states in the country without a meaningful teacher’s union or public employee collective 
bargaining rights. 
It took Riley’s intervention to reach an agreement with the SCEA. At a hastily-called 
meeting at the association’s headquarters, Riley answered questions from members and 
assured the group that pay raises to the Southeastern average would be a plank in the 
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program. However, the SCEA would have to compromise on setting salaries at the 
national level and the proposed accountability measures if they wanted a salary increase. 
They wanted some things I couldn’t go along with, and we had the question of 
were they going all the way with me, but not on this -- the commitment we would 
get the teachers’ pay up to the Southeastern average? Not over the Southeastern 
average, but up to it. 
And the teachers – well, I won’t get into all that detail – but they complained 
about not having this and not having that. And I said, you know, if you all want to 
support me, fine; and if you don’t, fine. But I do have in the proposal raising 
teacher pay up to the Southeastern average (R. Riley, personal communication, 
March 10, 2014). 
The teachers finally agreed, and these frank discussions helped make the SCEA one of 
Riley’s most powerful allies (personal communication, March 10, 2014). 
Consensus on controversies worked out by the task force produced three outcomes. 
First, it solidified acceptability of the recommendations among its members. Second, it 
deepened understanding of the reasons behind the proposal’s platforms, which prepared 
members to explain to their grassroots counterparts the necessity of the plan and its 
funding. Third, the task force discussions served as dress rehearsals for the legislative 
battles ahead. 
4.2.2. A community approach to education policy. 
Community participation in education is the academic expertise of Larry Winecoff 
and Conrad Powell. Beginning with the Civil Rights movement, the two University of 
South Carolina professors worked with schools and communities throughout the 
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Southeast, addressing local problems arising from school desegregation. Underwritten by 
a Mott Foundation grant, they systematically guided public discussions about their local 
schools, then used the data to assist the community and schools to partner for the 
improvements both groups deemed necessary. 
Throughout their years working with communities and schools, they developed a very 
specific method to organize and facilitate citizen discussion groups, gather information, 
and synthesize it into recommendations to help schools solve problems and form better 
community partnerships. 
We did workshops, like community based workshops. One goal was to train 
community education coordinators. And the second one, to help the community 
own their schools and open up the schools for afternoon and evening activities, 
running all the way from vocational training to playing bridge. So, we had a lot of 
community forums around the state and throughout the southeast (L. Winecoff, 
personal communication, April 7, 2015). 
To oversee the community forums, Winecoff and Powell trained doctoral students from 
USC’s College of Education as meeting facilitators. Their school and community 
partnership work took them throughout South Carolina, building a network of school 
district contacts. 
The school and community approach was very specific as to organizing and 
facilitating meetings to ensure an open discussion among all stakeholders. They 
developed a template reflecting a seven-step planning guide for school districts. These 
steps included identifying and assessing problems, setting goals, anticipating problems, 
and continued monitoring.   
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In 1980, Winecoff and Powell worked with S.C. First Lady Ann Yarborough Riley on 
a statewide citizen participation in education project. A project planning guide was 
developed to help school districts reach four goals: devising simple, useful plans to 
increase citizen participation in their schools; providing a uniform system of information 
collecting; identifying problems and setting realistic goals, and using the collected data to 
build and sustain the participation programs. These four goals mirrored what the Riley 
administration hoped to accomplish when launching its Fall 1983 citizen participation 
campaign.  
 The Winecoff and Powell participatory plan was incorporated into the seven regional 
forums designed to rally public support for Riley’s school reform agenda. However, 
gubernatorial pep rallies would not encourage citizen buy-in, no matter how enthusiastic 
the event.  Understanding that public ownership was critical to citizen activism, Riley’s 
advisors asked the two USC professors to use their expertise to organize and facilitate 
small group sessions following each forum, just as they had done during their previous 
school and community projects. 
 However, their task was not limited just to gathering public input, but also to 
designing the plan for citizen discussions, using their network of school district contacts 
and trained facilitators. In addition, Winecoff and Powell were to submit summaries from 
the small group discussions to the Governor’s Office 24 hours after the events. These 
summaries later were incorporated into the Riley education proposal (L. Winecoff and C. 
Powell, personal communication, April 7, 2015).  
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4.3 Engaging Citizen Support throughout the State 
With the organizing blueprint complete, Riley launched a campaign to engage the 
public. The state committee, which was working on the specifics of the reforms, had not 
finished its proposal or designated a way to fund it. They waited until October to formally 
announce their recommendations, so that they could incorporate ideas that emerged in the 
public forums.  
Primary to citizen engagement were the seven regional forums, conducted by Riley, 
together with the state education superintendent, supportive legislators, district 
superintendents, and teachers of the year. The active involvement of Lieutenant Governor 
Mike Daniel was particularly effective. Like Riley, Daniel was elected in November 
1982, which increased his statewide name recognition and maintained his political 
contacts. According to the governor’s staff, the lieutenant governor became a second 
spokesman for the EIA. This was a unique partnership for South Carolina. “So, that’s a 
big help when you’ve got two of the highest office holders in the state really working on 
a major initiative” (B. Prince, personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
However, going to the public for support was not risk free. Newspaper editorial 
boards pointed out that Riley faced a “terrific selling job between now and January” for 
more school funding, pointing to his sales tax defeat during the 1983 session. “The 
governor and educators are taking a risk by going directly to the people, but the greater 
risk is to sit on the sideline and do nothing” (The Greenville Piedmont, 1983, September 
30).  
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4.3.1 Rolling out the campaign. 
The effort to build public activism had all the earmarks of a political campaign. Plans 
included a statewide public opinion poll, pep rally-like town hall meetings, earned and 
paid media, and an unprecedented statewide television speech by Riley to promote the 
school reform recommendations and the need for funding. 
When he announced the forums, Riley said that taking his case to the public would be 
a way to create a political climate for change. “I think the ultimate goal is to reach 
legislators, and I think the way to reach legislators properly – since they are 
representatives of the people – is to go to the people and involve them in the process,” 
Riley announced (Weston, 1983, August 23, p. 1B). Laying success squarely on citizen 
activism, the governor told the media that it would be “very damaging politically” for 
lawmakers to oppose an education plan that the public perceived would bring results 
(Weston, 1983, August 23, p. 1B) 
The plan for the regional forums was rolled out at the same time as a statewide 
opinion poll, commissioned by the governor’s office. The poll gauged public opinion on 
school reform and funding. The results showed that close to 80% of the respondents 
supported school improvement and raising teacher salaries. Seventy five percent stated 
that they would support a legislator who favored a tax increase to fund better schools. 
However, polling data showed opinion evenly split between raising the sales tax and 
using existing state revenue to fund improvements.  
These polling results met immediate media and legislative skepticism. The reliability 
and methodology of the poll were questioned.  Conflicting results over support for a tax 
increase “might make Riley overly optimistic” (The Anderson Independent, 1983, 
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September 18). Regarding the poll, another editorial board noted that the “wheels of the 
well-orchestrated campaign seem a bit greased” (The State, 1983, September 11). 
Nonetheless, Riley stated that he hoped the poll numbers would convince legislators that 
a sales tax increase would not be a political liability (Sayles, 1983, September 8). 
The poll not only was a well-publicized segue to the upcoming citizen forums, but 
also served to pinpoint language that initiated positive responses from the public. Later, 
this wording was used when producing public service television ads, which were aired to 
encourage average citizens to contact their legislators in support of education reform and 
funding. 
4.3.2 Seven regional forums. 
Riley’s strategy to involve the public centered around the seven regional forums, a 
combination pep rally and town hall meeting staged to generate community buy-in. 
Drumming up statewide citizen support meant getting away from the state capital and out 
into local school districts. Public forums were a success for Mississippi Governor 
Winter’s school reform campaign; however, the South Carolina regional meetings 
included additional strategies. One was “Excellence in Education Day,” specifically 
planned to get Riley and his team into every county that was encompassed by the 
regional forums. 
Prior to each evening’s forum, Riley, his wife, the lieutenant governor, and state 
education superintendent fanned out across the region’s counties, visiting schools and 
meeting with students, teachers, and especially parents. Visits by the governor and other 
officials served not just to encourage attendance at the evening regional forum. It also 
80 
 
allowed Riley one-on-one meetings to hear teacher and parents’ concerns and personally 
solicit their help for school reform. 
The local school visits generated extensive local media coverage. Weekly newspapers 
ran detailed stories and multiple pictures of state officials eating lunch with students or 
having coffee with parents. To promote the county visits, the gubernatorial staff 
scheduled as many local radio interviews and editorial board meetings as time allowed. 
School districts accommodated by hosting community open houses at their schools. A 
practiced campaigner, Riley shook hands not only with faculty members, but also toured 
offices to meet school assistants and walked the lunch line to greet cafeteria workers. 
According to media reports, some 13,000 people attended the seven forums, held in 
high school gymnasiums or college auditoriums. The regional rallies were “like stump 
meetings and road shows of past South Carolina history” (The Greenville Piedmont, 
1983, September 30). Local high school bands played. In addition to Riley and other state 
leaders, speeches were made by local business leaders, teachers of the year, and at one 
forum, South Carolina’s Mother of the Year. Some districts offered school buses to 
transport citizens, who wanted to attend an out-of-town rally (Hendren, 1983, October 13, 
p. 1). 
Attendance at the seven forums indicated the strength of the contact networks tapped 
by the Riley team. Those encouraging attendance were not just educator networks, such 
as the SCEA, PSTA, or the state school administrators association. Significantly, parents 
involved in Mrs. Riley’s Citizen Participation Task Force joined the effort. This task 
force included School Improvement Councils (SIC) and PTAs around the state. Good 
government groups, such as the League of Women Voters, encouraged attendance.  
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Business and civic club were notified. Even religious leaders were asked to provide 
assistance, such as printing forum announcements in their church bulletins. At many 
forums, Riley began the day talking to regional chambers of commerce, where the 
groundwork had been set by Charleston attorney William Youngblood. Early in the 
planning process, Youngblood was designated “the business voice” of Riley’s reforms, 
building links to local chambers around the state. 
The regional forums received extensive newspaper and television coverage with 
reporters describing the rallies as “all-star education traveling shows,” a “public relations 
blitzkrieg,” and “an educational call to arms.”  However, not all attendees were positive 
about the experience. Legislators complained that Riley was vague when explaining to 
the crowds how funding for school improvements would be raised. At the Charleston 
business meeting, a school board chairman insisted that new revenue was not needed for 
improvements and objected to the state Department of Education handling any new 
funding. “They are the same crowd who got us into trouble in the first place” (Norton, 
1983, September 16, p. 6C).  
A consistent theme in Riley’s remarks was the importance of raising the state’s low 
teacher pay. Better salaries were needed to attract good candidates to the teaching 
profession, to treat teachers as professionals, and to underscore the value of education to 
the community, he said. While a large majority of teachers were enthusiastic about the 
reforms, one district teacher group said the state could not demand better quality in the 
classroom unless their salaries were increased (Burton, 1983, September 23, p. 1A). 
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While news coverage prominently featured the rallies and the speeches, there also 
was considerable coverage of the second segment of the town hall meetings: the small 
group participation meetings. 
4.3.3 Building public ownership through small group discussions. 
Riley and the forum speakers drew public enthusiasm, but it was the invitation to stay 
for the small group sessions that built citizen ownership. Scheduled to begin immediately 
after the speeches, the group sessions were a way for people to have direct input into the 
school improvement recommendations still being formulated by the statewide task force. 
The promise of input was not a ploy. Development of the final school improvement plan 
was deliberately kept flexible to allow the incorporation of the public’s ideas.    
According to Riley, the purpose of the group discussions were to allow people to 
“really talk about the programs. What programs did you think we ought to have or not 
have, and how are we going to pay for it? You really go into the details. Let people 
themselves talk about what we needed to do” (R. Riley, personal communication, March 
3, 2014). 
 Based on their previous community participation projects, Winecoff and Powell 
purposely tailored questions for the small group sessions to gather what forum 
participants specifically thought should be done to improve their local schools. While the 
meetings were recorded, it was not an opinion poll. The sessions synthesized citizen 
discussions of  community school needs into specific recommendations turned over to 
Governor’s Office and the task force writing the plan.  
Facilitators worked from an open-ended four page booklet to focus the discussions. 
These worksheets were much like the ones Winecoff and Powell devised for previous 
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public input projects, such as the Task Force for Citizen Participation in Schools, chaired 
by Mrs. Riley.  At the forum’s small group sessions, participants received the booklets to 
jot down discussion notes and to keep when they left. 
The first page listed Riley’s reform goals, leaving space for attendees to agree or 
disagree.  On the second page asked group members to write down specific suggestions 
to improve teacher preparation, curriculum, and funding for school reforms. In addition, 
an “other” section at the bottom of the page allowed participants to bring up problems not 
included in the three listed. The third worksheet page requested detailed strategies that 
Riley could use to better education. 
The last page was the most important to public engagement. Attendees were asked to 
list any activities they would undertake at home to implement the group’s ideas, 
including a timeline to accomplish them. The ownership constructed in the first three 
pages led to specific citizen action goals on the last. “Each of those groups would make 
some sort of commitment to the way they were going to help influence the passage of the 
EIA. Whether it was phone calls to legislators. Whether it was writing letters…” (C. 
Powell, personal communication, April 7, 2015). 
I think it was the fact that somebody gave them the opportunity to come in and talk 
about what their ideas were, comment about that, and have some real input at all these 
different forums. I don’t mean formally the forums, but I mean all the different ways 
people could do that (B. Prince, personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
Just as the forums drew big crowds, so did the small group sessions. Logistics became 
a problem since coordinators could not predict how many people might attend, and at 
times they were overwhelmed by the response. The carefully constructed plan grouped 10 
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to 15 people from the same county in a classroom with a trained recorder. When as many 
as 900 to 1,500 people stayed for the discussion sessions, the arrangement had to be 
reworked on the spot. More classrooms were opened, copies made, materials gathered, 
and additional facilitators recruited from school counselors, who were directing people 
into the classrooms. 
“Some of it was by the seat of our pants because you just couldn’t plan for how many, 
that many people. You never knew how many were going to show up. But we had really 
good facilitators, who could also, for the most part, change directions, change gears…” 
(C. Powell, personal communication, April 7, 2015). 
Compiling reports from the evening meetings was the next challenge for the 
university professors. Public suggestions were compiled and turned over to the 
Governor’s Office within 24 hours. Many of the group reports were released immediately 
to the media, which reported the community’s reform priorities. 
The small group recommendations collected from the seven forums showed “a 
remarkable similarity of responses among the participants” (Boone, Powell & Winecoff, 
1983, October 18).  Among the major themes were higher promotion standards, more 
remedial classes, mandatory full-day kindergarten, reduction in student-teacher ratio, and 
better gifted and talented programs. Raising teacher salaries was recommended, 
accompanied by higher certification standards. The most suggested method of paying for 
the reforms was a one cent increase in the state sales tax, coupled with the repeal of the 
state’s “Blue Laws.” 
Winecoff and Powell (1984) wrote that of the 67 public recommendations from the 
forum’s small group sessions, 61 were directly reflected in the final plan announced by 
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the statewide task force. “Similarly, the committee presented only seven 
recommendations that did not emerge in the forums” (p. 27). They also concluded that 
the participation sessions would allow the state “to make significant progress in reducing 
the gap between schools and their communities” (1984, p. 27). Even better for the Riley 
reform campaign, the public recommendations cemented the feeling of ownership and 
action among their supporters. 
Charged by the statewide task force to rework the propose plan to include the forums’ 
small group recommendations, Peterson concluded, “They felt like they were actually 
giving input and ideas into education topics that were being discussed at the state level, 
which most people, when they go to a meeting or a focus group or a forum, they don’t 
think anyone is ever going to use their information (personal communication, September 
4, 2015). 
4.4 Sustaining Grassroots Lobbying through the Legislative Session  
 With a new citizen support network built from the forums’ small group sessions 
and by invigorating established education, business, and civic contacts, the Riley team 
returned to the campaign tactics laid out in the July 23 memo. Major among these was a 
statewide television address by Riley after the blue ribbon committee approved the final 
reform proposal. The next tactic was to instruct newly-active citizen supporters in ways 
to contact their legislators. Finally, they arranged phone banks and marshaled supporter 
networks to reach the General Assembly. 
 4.4.1 Statewide television address. 
 Two weeks after the last forum, Riley’s education task force announced “The 
New Approach to Quality Education,” a 50-point school reform plan with raising teacher 
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pay to the Southeastern average as the centerpiece. Also included were monetary 
incentive rewards for teachers and improved school districts, more remedial education 
programs, curriculum for gifted students, and required kindergarten attendance. Because 
the plan was estimated to cost $210 million, the statewide committee endorsed raising the 
state’s 4 cents sales tax by a penny with all revenue to solely fund the “New Approach” 
proposals.  
 The sales tax increase and raising teacher pay came under immediate criticism.  
Republicans labeled the plan’s funding as a 25% tax hike. Influential legislators said the 
sales tax was “dead on arrival” and expressed reluctance to support an across-the-board 
teacher salary increase (Walser, 1983, November 27, p. 1D). One senior legislator said 
that “good teachers would never be paid enough in South Carolina, while poor teachers 
will always be paid too much” (Surratt, 1983, October 18). “That’s why Riley’s proposal 
will require the legislative equivalent of D-Day planning and execution if it is to pass 
through the hostile election year waters” (Walser, 1983, November 27, p. 1D) 
Division also appeared within the education community. SCEA president Vivian 
Watson said without the Southeastern average pay increase, she would have a hard time 
selling the additional responsibilities the plan would place on teachers (Surratt, 1983, 
October 20, p. 1A). A district superintendent questioned pouring money into remedial 
programs with less funding earmarked as incentives for good schools (Surratt, 1983, 
October 21, p. 1A.) 
 Such criticisms were common during controversial legislation proposals. 
However, to shore up support and maintain public momentum, Riley announced he 
would make a statewide televised address to explain the need for the “New Approach” 
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and tax increase. However, the underlying purpose of his speech was persuading people 
to actively contact their legislators to support the plan.  
 While gubernatorial State of the State addresses had been broadcasted in the past, 
usually on S.C. Educational Television (now ETV), it was unprecedented for a governor 
to address the state on a single issue via television. More remarkable, South Carolina 
commercial television stations also agreed to a live broadcast of Riley’s speech to the 
General Assembly. 
 In an “ unusual and direct appeal to South Carolinians,” Riley asked citizens to 
contact their legislators in support of the sales tax increase for education. “A penny is a 
small price to pay for the thoughts of a generation,” Riley said. “A penny is a small price 
to unleash the unlimited potential of our state” (Sayles, 1983, November 23, p. 1A). 
 Citizen engagement was the repeated theme of the 22- minute speech. “You can 
make the difference. I ask you to tell them,” Riley stated (Weston, 1983, November 23, p. 
1A). “I urge you to speak up because I can assure you those who insist we’ve come as far 
as we can will be speaking up,” Riley said (Walser, 1983, November 23, p. 1A).  
Following the speech, editorials focused on Riley’s “emotional” appeal to citizen 
activism. The Charlotte Observer editorial board wrote, “We hope citizens who watched 
Gov. Riley’s speech will work hard to persuade their legislators that adding a penny to 
the sales tax is a very sound and needed investment in South Carolina’s future” (1983, 
November 27). A similar editorial in The Greenville News stated, “The governor’s appeal 
was not for legislative action, but for public support that will encourage and prod 
lawmakers to join in this bold initiative for the schools” (1983, November 27). One 
columnist suggested, “The governor’s success in getting a commitment for quality 
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education depends directly on the pressure applied to legislators, one on one, by 
constituents” (Bowie, 1983, November 26).  
However, other editorial boards were not convinced, writing that the Riley plan 
“has holes big enough to drive a truck through” (The Charleston Post and Courier, 1983, 
November 29). Referring to Riley’s appeal for public support, one columnist predicted, 
“Those who argue against additional funding for education will be made to look and feel 
like Scrooge. They will be railed at from the pulpit. Teachers will urge little boys and 
girls to write nasty letters” (Shreadley, 1983, November 27). 
 A few legislators, who watched the speech from home rather than at the 
Statehouse, admitted that they immediately received constituent telephone calls in 
support (Dozier, 1983, November 23, p. 1A). However, most said they remained 
unconvinced that the tax increase was needed or would pass. 
 4.4.2 Paid television advertising. 
 From the beginning, earned and paid media were part of the strategy. Due to the 
forums and television speech, the Riley plan received intense “earned media” coverage 
from newspapers and television stations. The July 23 memo proposed an additional step: 
production of paid public service advertisements. The purpose of the ads was to urge the 
public to support Riley’s reform proposal and to educate citizens about how to contact 
legislators. 
August polling revealed that a majority of the public supported school reform. 
However, it also showed that citizens did not know how to lobby lawmakers. Chernoff 
and Silver, a professional public relations team, told Riley:  
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People are all for you, but how do you turn them into advocates for action? You 
don’t have to convince them to be advocates. They’re already advocates, but they 
don’t know what to do. And that was the most interesting observation because 
that’s what prompted the combination of the speech and the ads. You have to 
explain and say what we need. So write a letter, make a phone call” (T. Peterson, 
personal communication, September 4, 2015). 
With the slogan “A penny for their thoughts,” the Columbia public relations firm 
produced three public service announcements. The scripts specifically demonstrated how 
citizens could lobby. One showed a worker in a hard hat sitting down to lunch, saying: 
I never have been much on group activities. But tonight, instead of going bowling, 
I’m gonna’ do something really important. Something for my kids. A bunch of us 
are calling legislators in favor of this penny increase in the sales tax for 
education…. I just want to help give them a decent education. They deserve it. 
And a penny? Shoot. Smartest money I ever spent. (Turning to co-workers) Are 
you with me? (Script in possession of Terry Peterson.) 
Another ad featured a pregnant young woman walking to the mailbox, holding a letter 
and saying: 
I’m not much of a letter writer. But I’m sending this to my state representative. I 
want him to know that I think it’s time we did something to improve education in 
South Carolina. And to let him know I’m in favor of this penny increase in the 
sales tax. I figure if enough of us speak out, we’ll get tougher standards, special 
programs for special kids, and top-notch teachers. I’ve never done this kind of 
90 
 
thing before. But this time, it’s worth the effort. (Script in possession of Terry 
Peterson.) 
The three ads ended with a voiceover of the campaign’s slogan, “A penny for their 
thoughts.” 
 Immediately, the state Republican Party chairman asked the state education 
television network for time to rebut the tax increase; the Libertarian Party asked the 
same. Both appearances were granted. The S.C. Merchants Association executive director 
said it was “a mistake for Riley to go over the heads of the Legislature and go to the 
public” (Johnson, 1983, December 5, p. 5A). Other tax opponents criticized the tax as 
regressive for the poor and elderly. 
  A private foundation already existed to raise money for the Riley school reform 
campaign. Organized by Riley political supporters, the Foundation for Excellence and 
Economic Development paid $13,000 for the August public opinion polling. With the 
need to produce the public service ads and buy television air time, the foundation raised 
an additional $83,000 (Weston, 1983, November 21, p. 1A). However, questions arose 
about other funding used to promote the EIA with the public. 
 In addition to the foundation money, a $148,000 grant from the Appalachian 
Regional Council (ARC) was used to promote the EIA and tax increase. The grant money 
went toward the television ads, printed mailers, mailing costs, and other promotional 
items (King, 1984, January 9, p. 3C). When opponents protested, Riley countered that use 
of the ARC money was legitimate because the commission approved the grant to advance 
South Carolina public education. As the dispute continued, columnists wrote the 
controversy diverted attention away from the reform debate (The State, 1984, January 
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16). Throughout these disagreements, most legislators said that the public engagement 
campaign had not changed their minds about the tax increase. 
4.4.3 Activating citizen support networks  
While the Riley television speech and public service commercials dominated the 
air waves, the ground game now became activating the public support networks. Most 
significant was tapping the resources of the SCEA. 
 With 20,000 members, the SCEA had numbers, an established statewide 
organization, and political know-how. It also had a strong communication network from 
its state association office to the school level. While no electronic technology was 
available at that time, the association could quickly alert teachers through its regional 
“Uniserve” districts, county committees, and school contacts without relying on mailed, 
mimeographed newsletters. This contact “tree” was effective in getting the word out 
quickly with the fewest number of telephone calls. 
 Although SCEA was stronger in some areas of the state than others, the 
organization was known to legislators. This familiarity was due to the political training 
SCEA provided its members, its election endorsements, and campaign donations from its 
political action committee. It also employed lobbyists to track bills and marshal 
legislative support at the Statehouse. 
 At one time, both administrators and teachers belonged to the SCEA. Prior to the 
EIA effort, superintendents and principals formed their own organization, the S.C. 
Association of School Administrators (SCASA). Although there were times the teacher 
and administrator organizations differed on public school issues, the EIA united them. 
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As Riley’s school reform built momentum during the legislative session, former 
SCEA lobbyist Joe Grant said administrators “recognized that they didn’t have the 
political muscle alone to make it happen” (personal communication, July 23, 2015). 
So they (administrators) were effective in allowing our members to take time off 
to come down and lobby. By doing that, they gave, certainly implied, approval 
and support for the cause. Now, I don’t remember any specific, independent 
action from the administrator organization at that time. But we were happy to 
simply have them give our members the flexibility – the teachers the flexibility – 
to come down to the lobby, to do stuff back in the districts that supported the 
whole public Education Improvement Act effort. The administrators would cover 
their substitute pay, those kinds of things. We would tell them we need large 
numbers, and they would help us get large numbers (J. Grant, personal 
communication, July 23, 2015). 
Choosing teachers to travel to the Statehouse was not haphazard. When specific 
lawmakers were targeted, teachers from their legislative districts were brought to 
Columbia to lobby. SCEA President Vivian Watson remembered: 
  We would have legislative lobbying days, and actually, the school districts and 
our superintendents again supported us in that. And they would bring buses in -- a 
bus load in from Greenville and different places. So, they (teachers) would be 
there to lobby, and then some of the school districts would provide a bus. It 
depended on how many were coming. But the associations would work with the 
school districts, and they would get a bus and come in. And maybe there would be 
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20 or 30 of them from some of the school districts (personal communication, 
April 23, 2015). 
Watson said that some administrators acted as substitute teachers to allow faculty 
members to lobby at the Statehouse (personal communication, April 23, 2015). 
 According to former PSTA executive director Elizabeth Gressette, her association 
did not encourage political action. There was no concerted effort to get their teachers to 
the forums, nor did the PSTA support teachers leaving the classroom to personally lobby 
at the Statehouse. Although Gressette kept members notified of EIA developments 
through her newsletter, she received “little interaction” from the PSTA teachers. “I didn’t 
get a whole lot of stuff  back” (personal communication, March 3, 2015). 
However, Gressette said the PSTA board endorsed the EIA, and she was at the 
Statehouse daily during the legislative debates (personal communication, March 3, 2015). 
As the niece of a powerful senior state senator, she frequently was seen going in and out 
of her uncle’s office. “That was a very positive thing because she (Gressette) had sort of 
an inside track into what was going on, too” (V. Watson, personal communication, April 
23, 2015). 
 The Statehouse was not the only lobbying location, and teacher associations were 
not the sole participants. Parent organizations, such as the PTAs and SICs, also 
encouraged their members to contract legislators, as did the community members of Mrs. 
Riley’s Citizen Participation in Schools task force. The League of Women Voters urged 
their members to speak up. 
By mid-December, the Governor’s Office set up an “Education Hotline,” staffed 
by volunteers with the $500 cost paid by the EIA’s privately-funded foundation. One 
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duty of the “hotline” volunteers was to answer questions regarding the Riley proposal. 
More important, the volunteers used lists, compiled from the seven citizen forums, to call 
forum participants and ask them to support the EIA with their legislators.  
Forum participants received the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of their 
district legislators, and how to contact the Education Hotline. Also distributed were three 
different form letters with a message from Riley encouraging them “to write in their own 
words, but with suggestions of what to write” (Surratt, 1983, December 13). 
 The form letters set off protests. The Charleston Post and Courier editorial board 
insisted “Write in your own words!” and pointed out EIA letters to the editor sounded as 
if they were written by the same person (1983, December 16).  The Charleston County 
school board chairman questioned the ethics of a letter writing campaign. Developed by 
school principals, they asked faculty members to write a letter to their state senator and 
House member, endorsing the EIA and sales tax increase. The district superintendent told 
the school board that no school supplies or postage were used, but a Charleston legislator 
claimed that some teachers said they felt “coerced” into writing (Bennett, 1984, January 
25, pp. 1A, 2A).  
Underlying all these groups was Riley’s own extensive political network, built 
from supporters active in his past election campaigns. These groups ranged from wealthy 
donors, who gave to the EIA foundation, to rural black church communities. Although 
some educators were among the 65 regional forum coordinators, most were Democratic 
Party activists, lawyers, county and town council members, small business owners, and 
some legislators or spouses of legislators.  
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Riley tapped any support group he thought helpful, including a letter to fellow 
United Methodists. Citing Methodism’s history of education support, Riley asked church 
members to lobby for the EIA and tax increase at an upcoming legislative budget hearing 
(Riley, R.W., 1979-1987, Riley to Methodist Friends, February 29, 1984). A letter from 
the S.C. Baptist Education and Missionary Convention asked pastors to bring “every 
breathing soul” to lobby in Columbia during the EIA budget hearings. “Numbers are 
important. Many of our lawmakers are content that we cannot muster enough people to 
make a showing of strength. Please arrange a carpool, bring vans loaded, and even buses 
where possible” (Rich, J.O., Rich to Ministers and Friends of Public Education, January 
26, 1984).  
Despite these activities, prominent legislators said they had received little or no 
contact from the public. The chairman of the House budget committee said Riley had 
made “a good plea,” but he had received no telephone calls from his constituents (Sayles, 
1983, November 24). A fellow budget committee member said of the few calls he had 
gotten, a majority of his constituents were against the EIA tax increase (Dozier, 1983, 
December 2, p. 2A). 
Even editorial boards doubted active public support would make a difference in 
school reform funding. Quoting legislators who said the EIA and sales tax increase “are 
dead and buried,” editors of The Sumter Daily Item wrote: 
The governor, however, is counting on his constituency, which includes all the 
voters in the state, to get behind his proposal and put pressure on their legislators 
to respond positively. So far, except for the expected endorsement from special 
interest groups, there has been no discernible strong grassroots support for the 
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package. That may change as the debate in the legislature gets underway (1984, 
January 13). 
The lack of—or, perhaps, denial of—grassroots support was an important obstacle, but it 
was not the only one 
4.5 Obstacles to Building and Sustaining Citizen Activism 
 Because the sales tax increase was defeated in the previous legislative session, 
Riley knew that the penny tax funding for the EIA would be a major hurdle, particularly 
in a legislative election year. This challenge was apparent following the Nov. 22 
television address, when the governor explained the 50-point “New Approach to Quality 
Education” and the need for the one cent tax. 
Opponents immediately started speaking up. Legislative objections focused more 
on the tax increase than on the reform plan itself. Colleges and universities asked why 
their institutions were not included in possible new education funding. State employees 
thought they needed a pay increase as much as the teachers. Also, higher taxes were 
hardly a popular issue with the general public.  
Beyond anticipated difficulties selling the tax increase, other obstacles arose 
among some EIA support groups, requiring quick resolution to maintain momentum and 
their contact networks. 
 4.5.1 Educators’ reluctance and disagreements. 
 Like all professions, educators have a range of opinions and are not monolithic. 
Disagreements are common among teachers, administrators, school boards, state 
education department officials, and teacher associations. Such was the case in South 
Carolina. After Riley’s EIA televised address, there were no immediate endorsements of 
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the reform plan, even though education groups worked on the task force devising the 
proposal, and hundreds of educators participated in the regional forums that provided 
input into the plan. 
 In early January, five state education groups came together “in an unprecedented 
effort” to jointly express their support for the EIA (Wire reports, 1984, January 3). The 
groups were the SCEA, PSTA, SCASA, the school boards association, and the state  
PTA, organizations “known to squabble with each other in the past” (Wire reports, 1984, 
January 3).  
Although the plan included a teacher pay increase to the Southeastern average, 
there was no immediate endorsement of the reform from the two teacher associations. 
Some teachers were reluctant to pay more taxes even to receive a salary boost. “A lot of 
people had reservations about the tax, including our own members,” said SCEA lobbyist 
Joe Grant (personal communication, July 23, 2015). 
Grant said some teacher salary improvements were included in the 1977 
Education Finance Act, a complicated law aimed at equalizing school funding to poor 
districts and providing a basic level of revenue for all schools. However, Grant observed: 
The assumption is that because you work in the field, you will automatically 
support those things that are designed to improve the field is a falsehood. Because 
we found at the time of selling (it) to the membership, it all boils down to how 
does it affect me and my pocketbook personally, no matter what the overall goals 
are” (personal communication, July 23, 2015). 
 Political involvement was part of the SCEA mission. Despite this, Grant said 
some of the association’s teachers were not comfortable with the SCEA’s candidate 
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endorsements, political contributions, and active Statehouse lobbying. The “friction” 
experienced on political and governance issues usually rose from local members. While 
the association retained good enrollment numbers, the SCEA leadership could not assume 
all its teachers automatically would embrace an education cause, including the EIA sales 
tax increase. “Everybody wasn’t cut from the same cloth. We had to sort of manage that” 
(J. Grant, personal communication, July 23, 2015).  
Grant attributed some of the internal differences to an increase in conservatism 
among SCEA members, stemming from the growth of the Republication Party in South 
Carolina. Grant noted that “…a lot of members were transitioning from yellow dog 
Democrats to being new Republicans. Accommodating for that political difference was as 
big a part of our struggle to get broad-based support for the penny as anything else” 
(personal communication, July 23, 2015). 
Also, more conservative teachers, who objected to political activism, had an 
alternative with the recent establishment of the PSTA. The PSTA’s mission did not 
encourage political involvement, and Statehouse lobbying was limited to Gressette with 
no teacher members accompanying her. Even after passage of the EIA, educator 
opposition to the tax increase continued. At the start of the 1984 school year, one high 
school principal grumbled about the difficulties educators faced in implementing the new 
requirements. The administrator said he did not favor the tax increase or some of the 
EIA’s reforms. “Teachers are good at two things,” he said. “They jump on the 
bandwagon, and they carry things to the extremes. That’s what’s going to get us into 
trouble” (Compton, 1984, August 20, p. 5A). 
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In addition to the sales tax, disputes arose about the reform plan itself, particularly 
business’ insistence on merit pay for teachers. According to Peterson, neither teachers nor 
administrators supported the merit pay platform. Merit pay “would be a deal breaker. The 
whole package would have gone down” (personal communication, September 4, 2015). 
From the beginning, educators working on the task force also argued that the emerging 
plan did not cover all the schools’ needs. The teachers were “close to walking, even 
though they’d been involved (in the task force).” It took Riley’s personal intervention, as 
well as changing the terminology from “merit pay” to “incentive pay,” to reach a 
compromise (T. Peterson, personal communication, September 4, 2015). 
Another sticking point was the plan’s “pass to play” provision, requiring student 
athletes to maintain a C average to play sports. Vivian Watson recalled that some task 
force members, who were coaches or former coaches, disagreed with the proposal. They 
argued that team sports were the reasons many students came to school. This also was the 
position of various legislators, who objected to the "pass to play" component because 
they felt that many of their constituents “might not vote for them if their kids would not 
be able to play sports” (V. Watson, personal communication, April 23, 2015). 
Initially, African American organizations resisted “pass to play;” however, their 
objections were alleviated by the addition of remedial academic programs for students. 
After enactment of the EIA, Riley continued to hear more grumbling about the “pass to 
play” provision than any other (T. Peterson, personal communication, September 4, 
2015). 
When objections to funding for the Arts or programs for gifted students surfaced, 
Watson used the “pass to play” argument to her advantage: 
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I told them, you know, you’ve got to remember something. For every student who 
comes to school because he can play football or basketball, there are other 
students, who only come because they can be in the drama club, the chorus, the 
band, or the art classes. That’s their whole motivation for coming to school. And I 
said, that is just as important, and they deserve it just as much as the student who 
plays football (V. Watson, personal communication, April 23, 2015). 
Different positions on political activism resulted in tension between the two 
teacher associations. With PSTA as a new teacher organization, Gressette said she was 
thrilled to be a part of Riley’s reform task force and was sure that the SCEA “was 
chapped” when she was invited to participate (personal communication, March 3, 2015). 
With only about 1,000 PSTA members, Gressette said that the SCEA was the face of 
South Carolina’s teachers with the General Assembly. “It was remarkable to me that we 
were given the same vote and the same opportunity to voice an opinion as the SCEA. 
That was a big deal for us” (E. Gressette, personal communication, March 3, 2015). 
Unlike the SCEA, the Palmetto State Teachers Association did not have a large 
statewide network nor did it encourage its teachers to actively lobby. In keeping with 
their conservative position, the PSTA emphasized teacher dedication and love for 
children as the reason for better salaries. Meanwhile, the more aggressive SCEA cited 
South Carolina’s low national ranking in teacher pay as one reason to keep up with 
neighboring states that already had increased teacher wages. 
Although there were “never any major battles” between the two associations, 
Watson remembered that they “clashed” during some of the task force sessions, 
especially when Gressette argued that teachers entered the profession because they loved 
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children, not for the money. “I looked at her that day and told her, ‘I love teaching. It’s 
been my life. It’s all I ever want to do, but there’s not a damn thing wrong for getting 
paid for what you love to do.’ And I said, teachers deserve to get paid as professionals” 
(V. Watson, personal communication, April 23, 2015). 
The governor needed the support of both groups no matter the differences in their 
political philosophies. SCEA had large numbers and a well-established political network, 
resulting in vocal, visible advocates at the Statehouse. However, it was not the small 
membership that lessened the PSTA’s overall effectiveness. It was the reluctance to 
become actively involved. 
“I could never understand how any teacher would not embrace this passionately 
as anybody could. That’s what always struck me,” Prince said, wondering if PSTA had a 
division within the ranks. “If so, that’s a very lame excuse for something that’s obviously 
going to benefit your members and the people who walk in your classroom, the kids who 
walk into the classroom” (B. Prince, personal communication, August 5, 2015). Even 
without the PSTA’s activism, Peterson observed, “But we needed them because they 
were more Republican” (personal communication, September 4, 2015).  
4.5.2 “Tyranny of limited expectations.” 
State Superintendent of Education Charlie Williams caused a stir among 
legislators when he bluntly stated that South Carolina had “deliberately undereducated its 
people” to provide cheap labor for industries and farms. “A great deal of the problem 
we’re confronting is historical. We’re dealing with children and grandchildren of people 
who don’t understand the importance of education,” he said at a meeting of state agency 
directors. Conceding the point, one legislator warned Williams that he would “offend the 
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power structure of the state to say they wickedly and purposely kept people in servitude 
for exploitation” (Associated Press, 1983, November 11).  
Although more diplomatically phrased, Williams earlier took the same message to a 
regional forum audience, asserting the days were over when smokestack industries 
created jobs that required more brawn than brains. School improvement was needed, he 
said, because “the state is moving away from high muscle jobs to high brain power jobs” 
(Staff reports, 1983, September 23). South Carolina’s low national rankings across 
economic and education indicators confirmed Williams’ assertions. In 1983, the state was 
ranked 49
th
 nationally in per capita income, teachers’ pay, and funding per student. It was 
50
th
 in SAT scores and 47
th
 in the number of high school graduates.  
The undervaluing of education was not a new concept to Charleston attorney Bill 
Youngblood. Chosen by Riley to solicit business support for the EIA, Youngblood spoke 
of the link between good schools and good jobs to chambers of commerce and civic 
groups throughout the state. Youngblood said that he often confronted the attitude, 
“We’re a small, poor state, and we spend a lot of money on education, and we’re doing 
the best we can.” Youngblood labeled that mindset as “a tyranny of limited expectations” 
(personal communication, January 7, 2014). 
Like many states in the Deep South, South Carolina had embraced the Sunbelt 
economic strategy of cheap land, cheap labor, and low taxes. To sell the necessity of 
education reform, Youngblood told business groups that companies seeking cheap land 
and cheap labor could find more lucrative places to locate overseas. Low paying, low 
skill jobs would follow. A good example was the textile industry that employed 
thousands of South Carolinians. Already, textile production was being outsourced to the 
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Far East, which eventually led to the industry’s collapse in the state. However, as a 
dominant job creator, “The textile industry was still very strong, and they hadn’t quite 
realized they were about to die” (Youngblood, personal communication, January 7, 
2014). 
Youngblood’s constant message to business was “the only sustainable advantage we 
would have, would be the quality of our workforce” (personal communication, January 7, 
2014). However, the business community remained skeptical about the need for 
education improvement.  
I remember being in a big forum in Myrtle Beach, and the guy, who was the head of 
the South Carolina Automobile Dealers Association, brought the crowd down 
because I had just made a point about the need for school facilities. So this guy said, 
‘Well, hell, if kids can learn how to make love in the back of a Volkswagen, they can 
learn to read in a barn.’ The crowd thought that was wonderful, and I thought I’m not 
going to carry this crowd with that mindset (B. Youngblood, personal 
communication, January 7, 2014). 
As opposition grew to funding school improvements, a newspaper columnist noted 
that South Carolina frequently used poverty as an excuse. He wrote that the state “could 
move ahead with vigor paying the price for education excellence, or we can choke on the 
dust of our history, buying the myth that South Carolina is too poor to strive for 
greatness” (Bowie, 1984, January 28). 
4.5.3 Opposition to the sales tax increase 
The EIA’s recommendations were not the focus of Statehouse opposition. It was the 
penny sales tax increase. Influential House members, who controlled the state budget, 
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quickly announced their objections to the EIA’s tax increase and predicted it would sink 
the reform bill. Some grumbled that it was easy for Riley to push the additional one cent 
increase because he was not facing reelection in November as they were.  
In addition to the upcoming elections, legislators faced fierce pressure from a 
coalition of powerful businesses that objected to the sales tax. These were the state’s 
automobile dealers, the S.C. Merchants Association, and the state Textile Manufacturers. 
With some of its most powerful members against the EIA, the S.C. Chamber of 
Commerce was reluctant to endorse the school funding plan.  
In an “Open Letter to the People of South Carolina,” the S.C. Chamber asserted South 
Carolina was one of the poorest and most heavily taxed states in the country. The 
chamber contended that as a percent of taxable personal income, South Carolina’s state 
and local taxes ranked the 12
th
 highest in the nation and the 13th highest as a percentage 
of family income. Also, South Carolina was the third highest in state and local taxes 
among the Southern states (Sayles, 1983, December 8, p. 1A). However, by the 
beginning of the 1984 session, the state chamber endorsed the EIA funding, conceding 
that good schools were linked to future good paying jobs. 
Although most of the resistance was directed at the tax increase and not the school 
improvement recommendations, the state Merchants Association was early and vocal in 
its opposition to both. The association’s executive director traveled the state telling 
business clubs that students needed basic math skills more than computer skills, 
predicting the reform plan would produce “mediocrity at best” (Johnson, 1983, December 
5, p. 1A). 
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The Textile Manufacturers were even more aggressive. The textile association hired a 
well-known lobbyist to oppose the tax, funded a statewide poll to gauge the public’s 
support for a sales tax increase, and paid for the development of an alternative school 
reform plan to present to the General Assembly. Not all textile company owners opposed 
the EIA’s funding; however, international textile magnate Roger Milliken headed the 
opposition group. “Even teachers couldn’t combat Milliken” (B. Prince, personal 
communication, August 5, 2015). 
The funding debate also affected support among Riley’s usual Democrat allies in the 
General Assembly. The Speaker of the House, a Democrat, advanced a $90 million 
school improvement plan that eliminated the sales tax by cutting back the number of 
reforms. He argued that his alternative reform package was preferable because the sales 
tax was the most regressive of all taxes, and Riley’s $210 million legislation would 
burden the poor and elderly. 
While advocating the need for school reform, many newspaper editorial boards did 
not support the EIA sales tax hike. Some questioned whether school districts could 
effectively use the “gush of incoming money since they can’t seem to handle the money 
they receive now” (The State, 1984, May 17). Other editors complained that the sales tax 
was a regressive means of funding or questioned the wisdom of raising the salaries of 
incompetent teachers.  
As opposition groups argued against the plan, several editors took issue with the 
governor’s position that he would not compromise on full funding for the EIA. “He may 
mean that now, but Mr. Riley better prepare a fallback position – if he doesn’t have one 
already” (The State, 1984, December 9). 
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In the end, Riley got the $210 million school improvement plan funded by the one 
cent sales tax increase. However, during the legislative bargaining process, he agreed to 
cap the inventory tax and to a $300 sales tax limit on all cars and boats. 
4.6 The Most Effective Lobbying Strategies 
 The National Commission on Excellence in Education’s 1983 report A Nation At 
Risk directed public attention to the condition of the nation’s schools and the long term 
economic consequences of their decline. The 1983 ECS study reached similar 
conclusions. However, it was the nation’s southern governors who recognized 
improvement of their lagging public schools would positively influence their states’ 
lagging economies. 
 Each governor took his own path to education improvement, using different 
approaches to reform and funding. While all received recognition for their efforts, it was 
the 1984 EIA that the RAND Corporation deemed “the most comprehensive single piece 
of legislation this year” and a model for school reform (UPI, 1984, August 5, p. 1C). 
 From the beginning, the key to the EIA’s passage was mobilizing the public to put 
enough pressure on the General Assembly to enact a public school reform bill and its one 
cent sales tax increase. A number of strategies contributed to the successful completion of 
this goal. 
 4.6.1 Small group discussions and regional forums. 
 The fundamental lesson learned from Mississippi’s school reform effort was that 
public buy-in on the front end was critical if there is to be pay-off on the back end. 
Peterson noted that the EIA was built on “grassroots ownership.” From the business 
community to the people who attended the forums and small group discussion sessions, 
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“They all felt like they were part of this effort all the way along, including the necessary 
funding” (T. Peterson, personal communication, September 4, 2015).  
Riley observed, “We were trying to get the people involved – the general public 
involved – and that was a real key to the whole thing. You couldn’t get the legislature to 
pass a major education reform, unless you had very strong grassroots support” (personal 
communication, August 18, 2015). The seven regional forums constituted the main 
channel to public engagement, particularly the small group sessions that followed. “I 
think there’s always that point of trying to make people feel they have an opportunity to 
give some input, and that’s so important. People always feel good if they have the 
opportunity to hear for themselves and ask questions” (V. Watson, personal 
communication, April 23, 2015).  
To accomplish the “grass tops/grassroots” organization strategy, the regional 
forums were designed to grab media and public attention. “I think it would have been 
very, very difficult to get any grassroots people calling their legislators unless there had 
been the forums,” Peterson said. The forum speeches got people “fired up. Word would 
spread. Something is happening. This is a big deal” (personal communication, September 
4, 2015). 
While the forum speeches and visits to community schools on Excellence in 
Education Days stirred community excitement, the most important catalyst to citizen 
engagement was the small group sessions that followed the forums. It was there people 
discussed what they thought their local schools needed, and how to accomplish these 
ideas.  Each participant received a handout to write down their thoughts, and a facilitator 
was present at each group meeting to summarize the discussion. 
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Winecoff pointed out that the last page of the handouts was a summary of the 
activities each group devised to help pass the EIA. “Involvement was not just getting 
input but also getting a plan mobilized” (Winecoff, personal communication, April 2, 
2015). To sustain the effort, it was essential that “local people take ownership of it and to 
get them to buy in to the responsibility for making it happen in their areas” (C. Powell, 
personal communication, April 2, 2015).  
According to Prince, suggestions from the small groups resulted in more changes 
to the task force reform plan than any proposals advanced during the legislative process 
(personal communication, August 5, 2015). Prince said: 
The public was so strong behind the package because they had helped put the 
package together. We had stuck to that. I just think that was a key part of it. These 
forums and other activities were not just a sales job. They were a legitimate effort 
to try and get input from the public. I think that’s what ultimately helped us on the 
political side” (personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
 Winecoff and Powell (1984) reported that 61 of the 67 public recommendations from the 
small group discussions were incorporated into the final task force plan. 
 4.6.2 Including all stakeholders. 
While the grassroots were grown from the forums and small group sessions, the 
“grass tops” were stakeholders who had the influence and networks to encourage ground 
level support for the EIA. Many of the “grass tops” were leaders of education and parent 
groups, who could use their members to spread the word and activate their local 
communities. Others were lawyers and business leaders, whose contacts included 
chambers of commerce and civic clubs. Local elected officials with political networks 
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were among the “grass tops,” as well as good government groups, such as the League of 
Women Voters. Also included were supportive legislators with their own constituencies. 
The “grass tops” were formally known as the Committee on Financing Excellence in 
Education, charged with the task of designing the school improvement plan and the way 
to fund it. 
With such a diverse group, it is not surprising that they often did not see eye to 
eye on education issues. However, building ownership in the school reform effort was as 
important for the “grass tops” leaders as it was for the citizen grassroots. “When I talk to 
people about school reform, I say, not only do you want teacher and principal 
involvement to pass it. That may not be enough. You need other people – business and 
others. But if you want it to actually work and be implemented with positive enthusiasm, 
you’ve got to have them involved on the front end. Otherwise, there won’t be any 
ownership” (T. Peterson, personal communication, September 4, 2015). 
Early involvement also built trust in Riley’s leadership and his desire for school 
improvement. Task force member Bill Youngblood recalled, “This was something put 
together by colleagues we trust in the business community, colleagues the teachers trust 
from education, the superintendents, the parent associations” (personal communication, 
January 7, 2014). 
As part of the EIA strategy, the task force was formed first, not just to begin 
putting together the proposal, but also to assist in generating interest in the upcoming 
citizen forums. Through their communication networks, task force members would keep 
their associates informed of the school reform discussions, while also encouraging them 
to generate local turnout for the forums.  
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According to Peterson, the best combination for legislative passage was having 
support from both business and teacher groups simultaneously.  “You’ve got to have the 
business leaders and the educators at the same time, especially the teachers. They could 
generate numbers, and that was key” (T. Peterson, personal communication, September 4, 
2015).  
When reviewing reform efforts in other states, Peterson concluded that including 
teachers and principals from the outset was unique to the EIA initiative (personal 
communication, September 4, 2015). It paid off by building confidence among educators. 
“I remember feeling that he (Riley) didn’t want to do anything that was some big secret 
thing and dump it on people,” Watson said (personal communication, April 23, 2015).  
This assurance encouraged teachers to organize a valuable and extensive statewide 
communication network, which succeeded in increasing citizen activism in their 
communities. 
4.6.3 Sole focus of the governor. 
In July 1983, Riley agreed he would give singular attention to passing a school 
reform initiative during the 1984 legislative session. This commitment required that he 
use his powers of persuasion to gather a diverse group of potential supporters and to 
reconcile differences of opinion among group members. “It could not have been done 
without a governor, the bully pulpit of the governor,” said Youngblood. “Dick Riley was 
like Billy Graham. It was a lay ministry. So he pulled out all the stops to get the votes of 
the living and the dead” (personal communication, January 7, 2014).  
 It was Riley’s sole focus on education that excited teachers and maintained the 
momentum needed to get the legislation and funding passed during the twelve month 
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initiative. In addition to committing his attention only to school reform, Riley had the 
“unique” personal skills needed to build trust among a large, diverse group of supporters, 
Youngblood said.  “And one would have to have all five of them to pull something like 
this off: vision, ability to enlist others, timing, persuasion skills, and the fifth skill, (the) 
practicality to translate vision into reality” (Youngblood, January 7, 2014). 
The momentum was “constantly stoked” by Riley, who was “single-minded in his 
purpose, and it kept the rest of us single-minded in the purpose” (B. Prince, personal 
communication, August 5, 2015). Riley learned from the experiences of William Winter 
that focus, momentum, and quick passage were keys to the successful enactment of 
school reform. 
With public activism as the linchpin of the lobbying effort, Peterson said Riley 
could not afford the standard approach of a long, drawn-out education improvement 
study. The regional forums, polling, Excellence in Education Days, and task force 
deliberations were all accomplished in a three to four month timeframe. The quick 
building of grassroots support was “part of its success because you didn’t lose a lot of 
enthusiasm” (T. Peterson, personal communication, September 4, 2015). Therefore, Riley 
was fully involved in orchestrating the strategies from beginning to end. 
Riley built trust among competing groups because “he wasn’t the glamor man. 
That’s the whole thing” (V. Watson, personal communication, April 23, 2015). Prince 
recalled, “People realized this wasn’t just spin. He was the most stubborn about we 
weren’t going to change this package” (personal communication, August 5, 2015).  
Describing opponents of the EIA as “flattened by the governor’s steamroller,” The 
State’s editorial board wrote, “Nevertheless, those of us who continue to have doubts 
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about this legislation must give Dick Riley his due” (1984, March 20). After final 
legislative passage of the EIA and sales tax increase, The State noted:  
Now that the decision has been made, we salute the governor’s zeal, finesse and 
tenaciousness in winning a legislative nod to a tax that many citizens, perhaps a 
majority, opposed and one which many veteran legislators early on gave only a 
slim chance of approval this election year (1984, June 28). 
It was Riley’s commitment, along with public input, and the inclusion of educators that 
transformed support into political action. 
4.7 Citizens’ Impact 
While assistance from some influential business leaders was important to the 
EIA’s approval, it was the numbers generated by the grassroots movement that created 
the biggest impact on legislative approval in an election year. “We were trying to get the 
people involved – the general public involved – and that was a real key to the whole 
thing. You couldn’t get the legislature to pass a major education reform, unless you had 
very strong grassroots support” (R. Riley, personal communication, August 18, 2015). As 
citizen involvement began to grow, Prince observed: 
Legislators made a political calculation when they saw that more people were for 
it than against it, both statewide and in their districts. Their thinking was this is 
not going to hurt me politically to support it, but it will hurt me politically not to. 
While critical and absolutely important to it, the key to passing that (EIA) was the 
public support we had. Because eventually that’s what legislative votes come 
down to on something like this. Those were the people who were going to go in a 
voting booth. (personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
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Since winning legislative support depended on supporters and their voting power, teacher 
activism, communication networks, and at-home lobbying became important factors. 
4.7.1 Teacher activism. 
It was Riley’s own political organization and teacher activism that made the 
different in rallying EIA supporters (B. Prince, personal communication, August 5, 
2015). Due to its commitment to political activism, the 20,000 SCEA members played a 
central role in building citizen pressure, both at the Statehouse and in legislators’ 
districts. The SCEA was effective due to its membership numbers, ability to mobilize 
teachers at the local level, lobbying skills, and political clout through candidate 
endorsements and campaign donations. 
Numerically, when you get into that kind of fight, numbers make a difference, 
plus they (SCEA) had field staff in each region of the state. Unless you know the 
House or Senate member personally, which they (SCEA) might, like the local 
Chamber of Commerce might, some volume of contact makes a difference. That’s 
why the SCEA was so critical because they had the biggest number of people” (T. 
Peterson, personal communication, September 4, 2015).  
The strategy to involve teachers was carefully planned. Prior to the 1984 legislative 
session, the SCEA constructed a political agenda to keep members informed through its 
newsletter and field organizers. The association held meetings to explain the EIA details 
to teachers. Letter writing efforts began, and the SCEA designed an EIA campaign lapel 
sticker in the shape of a copper penny to identify teachers as supporters of the reform bill 
and sales tax increase.  
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Most effective to sustaining teacher engagement was keeping members informed 
on legislative action (J. Grant, personal communication, July 23, 2015). Knowing the 
specifics of the EIA legislation increased the impact of teacher lobbying. Local SCEA 
leaders “felt strongly enough that they could always stand up and speak, even if 
somebody was opposing things” (V. Watson, personal communication, April 23, 2015). 
Occasionally, educators’ lobbying plans met with criticism, including when the 
Charleston County school board chairman raised questions about a letter writing 
campaign by teachers. However, the district’s superintendent defended the activity, 
assuring the school board that no school time or supplies were used to write to legislators. 
Subsequently, the board chairman said the letter writing was “a harmless effort” (Bennett, 
1984, January 25, p. 2A). 
Some tactics attracted statewide media attention, including when 100 teachers 
lined up in front of their town’s post office to apply for a custodial job that they said paid 
better than their teaching salaries. The federal custodian position paid $19,867. Pointing 
out that the janitorial job required only a high school degree, the teachers complained that 
“It would take a master’s degree and 10 years teaching experience to make a beginning 
level janitor’s salary” (United Press International ,1984, February 12).  Despite media 
coverage, the demonstration resulted in critical editorials, which pointed out the job 
comparisons were not accurate. Janitors work twelve months, and teachers, 180 days, 
although one editorial board conceded, “Some teachers are underpaid” (The Charleston 
Post and Courier, 1984, March 7). 
The most significant impact was when teachers lobbied the General Assembly 
during the EIA legislative debates. Which teachers traveled to the Statehouse was 
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strategically planned to target particular legislators, who were waffling on their EIA 
support. Lawmakers who adamantly opposed the EIA funding were not approached. 
Rather, focus was placed on the “fence sitters.” Speaking at a statewide PTA convention, 
the state Senate Education Committee Chairman Harry Chapman said, “Fence sitting is 
very popular these days. I think you should make it very uncomfortable for every Senate 
or House member who’s doing it” (Associated Press, 1984, February 16). 
 “Quiet intimidation” was Watson’s term for selecting teachers from a legislator’s 
home district to lobby in Columbia. “It said we’re going to remember” the lawmaker’s 
opposition (V. Watson, personal communication, April 23, 2015).  
Grant said teachers, wearing the SCEA copper penny sticker, sent messages into 
the chambers asking their legislators to meet them in the Statehouse lobby. After gaining 
the lawmaker’s support, SCEA members gave their legislators a penny sticker to wear at 
the Statehouse. “Getting members who opposed it (the EIA) to see legislators wearing the 
penny sticker and such, helped us build the head of steam we needed to get through the 
process” (J. Grant, personal communication, July 23, 2015). 
SCEA got complaints from legislators about “strong arming them” by publishing 
their voting records, Grant said. The SCEA penny sticker, Statehouse lobbying, and 
informing teachers about how legislators voted on the EIA “were specifically-used 
tactics. It made them (legislators) know someone was watching. They couldn’t be 
incognito” (J. Grant, personal communication, July 23, 2015). 
Sitting with Mrs. Riley, who attended each legislative debate day, teachers filled 
the Statehouse balconies to track EIA voting. This led legislators to say “all those  
teachers in the galley. Why weren’t they home teaching?” (Keyserling, 1998, p. 232). In 
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the lobby, SCEA members monitored attendance of lawmakers to assure they were 
present for important votes. If a lawmaker changed his support, “We’d turn up the heat 
on them,” said Grant (personal communication, July 23, 2015).  
Although a majority of lobbying teachers were women, this did not lessen their 
effectiveness with the male-dominated General Assembly. Because the teachers were 
briefed before entering the Statehouse to lobby, they felt empowered by their knowledge 
of the EIA plan.  “Women are less intimidated by men than men are by men. If you really 
want to get a point made, just send a woman who’s fired up because she’ll get the point 
made every time” (J. Grant, personal communication, July 23, 2015). 
In addition to watching from the Statehouse balconies and waiting in the lobby, 
teachers also attended legislative committee meetings, particularly monitoring work on 
the state budget, which included the tax increase. As the session progressed, the EIA 
school proposals received few objections from legislators. The strongest opposition was 
directed at the tax increase and, to a lesser degree, teacher pay raises. 
While most legislators agreed South Carolina teachers were underpaid, debate 
centered on how to distribute increased funding for teacher salaries. The EIA proposed an 
across-the-board increase of teacher salaries to the Southeastern average. That raised the 
question whether some teachers deserved a bigger increase than others. “In what way will 
public education be improved by paying the same inadequate teachers more to do the 
same inadequate job?” (Shreadley, 1983, November 27). 
Legislators voiced similar concerns during the EIA budget debate, proposing 
alternatives to the across-the-board pay increase. However, teachers’ presence at budget 
meetings had an impact. In working out a compromise on the pay raises, “House 
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members wanted to make sure they wouldn’t be criticized by teachers back home. 
Legislators said most of the hyperactivity in the House over the matter Thursday was 
spurred by heavy pressure from the teachers’ lobbies, especially the S.C. Education 
Association” (Eichel, 1984, March 2). Peterson recalled that teacher criticism back home 
took a personal turn for one “fence sitting” House member, who said his teacher 
girlfriend told him that “until he delivered on the EIA he might as well sleep on the sofa” 
(personal communication, September 4, 2015). 
When the state budget committee voted 16-6 to restore full funding for teacher raises, 
the vote drew “applause from the overflow teacher and PTA crowd who packed the 
committee room” (Schneider, 1984, February 16). According to news reports, seven 
legislators, who had been voting against the pay increase, changed their votes. 
Even though teachers directed their lobbying efforts at legislative “fence sitters,” 
the influence of their activism also was felt by legislators who staunchly opposed the 
EIA, especially the sales tax increase. This included House Ways and Means Chairman 
Tom Mangum, who was a powerful gatekeeper to the state budget. From the outset, 
Mangum predicted the EIA sales tax would never pass out of his budget committee.   
In the aftermath of the 1984 legislative session, The Charlotte Observer reported 
that the House budget chairman was “campaigning hard” for reelection in his home 
district. The reason for his efforts was his opposition to the EIA sales tax. Due to his 
outspoken resistance to the reform plan, “Mangum also didn’t make friends among 
teachers, whose statewide professional association has fought vigorously for passage of 
the Riley plan” (Permutt, 1984, June 1). 
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Prince said teacher activism was powerful because they would return to their 
communities and discuss what they saw at the Statehouse with other teachers and 
community members. “Overall, the SCEA’s strength, like education’s strength, was in 
places where most of the votes are in terms of legislators” (B. Prince, personal 
communication, August 5, 2015). 
 4.7.2 Creating a communication network. 
 A grassroots campaign is only as good as its methods of communicating with 
supporters. A grassroots political movement is not effective unless it can contact 
members immediately when important events occur. The ability to respond to 
developments, such as a critical legislative vote, relied on a “really sophisticated 
communication network” developed specifically for the EIA (T. Peterson, personal 
communication, September 4, 2015).  
At the outset, the “grass tops” task force members were chosen not just for their 
diversity, but also for their extensive statewide contacts. Before the regional forums, task 
force members generated local participation through their communication channels. In 
addition to the task force, each of the seven forums had an organizing committee made up 
of local leaders from counties in the region. These leaders arranged the place and 
schedule for the forum, all the while encouraging local turn out.  
Each leadership group was well connected. However, for a statewide undertaking 
based on citizen mobilization, the EIA needed its own unique contact network, one that 
could directly alert advocates and organizations when a quick response was needed. “So, 
if you’re just a typical grassroots movement, you wouldn’t even hear about the vote until 
it happened. In the EIA case, our supporters had to know the vote was coming up the next 
119 
 
day or the next week on four or five big issues or budget items, so they could 
immediately call or contact their legislators,” Peterson said (personal communication, 
September 4, 2015). 
Three components formed the EIA network.  They were phone banks, contact lists 
compiled from the forums’ small group discussions, and membership rolls from teacher 
and parent organizations. Through this network, the governor’s office coordinated the 
messages sent to advocates and developed the most effective strategies to influence 
legislators. 
Contacting supporters was more complicated in the 1980s since communication 
was limited to telephone calls, mailings, organization newsletters, and associations’ 
telephone “trees.” With no electronic methods, such as email, websites and social media, 
the telephone was the quickest form of contact. Consequently, the governor’s office 
established a telephone bank “hotline” as a specific means of getting word out about the 
education reform plan. 
The phone bank operated for about the first half of the legislative session.  The 
EIA private foundation paid $500 to set up the arrangement, which was manned by 
volunteers five days a week. Operating out of Columbia, the majority of the 57 volunteers 
were educators, which included principals, teachers, and university professors. Other 
volunteers were Riley’s political supporters and Democratic Party members. The phone 
bank volunteers answered questions about the specifics of the EIA, but more important, 
they let supporters know about upcoming legislative votes, and where their lawmakers 
stood on the reform plan and tax increase. 
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The membership rolls of well-established education, parent, civic club and good 
government groups became central components of the EIA network. Most of these 
organizations had well-developed systems to contact members and were familiar with 
phone bank operations. In addition, lists compiled from those who attended the forums’ 
small group discussions became a valuable part of the statewide network. During the 
group discussions, participants were asked for contact information to receive updates as 
the EIA moved through the General Assembly. During the post-forum discussions, 
participants also listed activities that they could organize in their communities to support 
the school reform bill, which broadened local outreach.  
The EIA communication network was vital to maintaining grassroots momentum 
during the legislative session. Education organizations, such as SCEA, PSTA, SCASA, 
PTAs, and SICs, formed telephone banks not just to contact their own members, but also 
people who attended the forum small group sessions. At times, county voter registration 
lists were used to track down constituent telephone numbers in certain legislative 
districts. Volunteers would “cold call” voters in those districts and ask for their support 
for the legislation.  
During critical Statehouse debates, calls from the telephone banks were 
strategically organized. Calls were made to citizen supporters in a specific legislator’s 
district, particularly if the lawmaker was known to be a “fence sitter.” The phone bank 
volunteers did not contact the legislator about an upcoming vote. It was the constituent 
who called the legislator, an effective approach in an election year. According to 
Peterson, hard core opponents were never called. “We didn’t want them to know what we 
were doing” (T. Peterson, personal communication, September 4, 2015).  
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“During important House budget votes, we would run the phone banks and ask 
the education groups to focus on lobbying four or five House or Senate members because 
the votes were so close,” said Peterson (personal communication, September 4, 2015). “It 
was just very important that we had the teachers from those different districts to come in 
(to the Statehouse), and to write letters, and to make phone calls” Watson said, “That was 
kind of a push all the way through, being in constant contact with them” (personal 
communication, April 23, 2015). 
During an EIA sales tax debate, senior Riley aide Dwight Drake recalled, “The 
people would call their legislators and give them hell. One by one we picked them off. By 
the end, some legislators were promising to vote yes if we’d only stop the phone calls” 
(Hitt, 1986, October, p. 42). 
Although not as immediate, newsletters became a good source of information 
about legislative support. Typical was a special edition of the School Advisory Council 
News. Headlined “State Senate Prepares to Act on Governor’s Package,” a front page 
article by task force chairman Bill Page asked school advisory parents to contact their 
state senators, warning the council members that “Senate passage of this legislation is not 
certain.” Listed on the front page were the names and office telephone numbers of all 46 
state senators (Page, 1984, May). 
The EIA communication network magnified citizen impact by directing 
supporters, particularly constituents, to contact specific legislators before specific votes. 
“What had not been totally factored from their (legislators) experience was this 
groundswell of popular support that came to them in various ways,” Prince said. “I just 
think that the public momentum we created gave legislators the sense that ‘I can make 
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this vote’” (personal communication, August 5, 2015). Business support was important 
“because it gives a brand of credibility, but without that grassroots support, we would not 
have changed votes” (B. Prince, personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
4.7.3 At home lobbying. 
 “Just because they’re in church, they don’t get a pass.” That was SCEA lobbyist 
Joe Grant’s advice to teachers during the grassroots push for the EIA (personal 
communication, July 23, 2015). This meant promoting the bill’s passage was not 
confined to the Statehouse or the telephone banks. “You got to get them when they are 
not in an environment where they feel empowered,” Grant said, indicating their 
hometowns were a powerful place to influence lawmakers (personal communication, July 
23, 2015). 
While Statehouse lobbying was one way to influence legislators, “We’d also have 
people when they’d go home,” Prince said. “There would be teachers and others waiting 
to meet with them when they went back home. I imagine there were a lot of discussions 
heard around churches” (personal communications, August 5, 2015). The SCEA’s copper 
penny sticker also was a way for hometown supporters to show legislators their support. 
Grant said, teachers distributed the penny stickers to family members and friends. He also 
said the black churches were actively involved in the at-home lobbying effort (personal 
communication, July 23, 2015). Getting the support of black churches was “effective at 
getting black folks involved with politics, and by extension, getting teachers and their 
families involved in politics was a natural progression” Grant said (personal 
communication, July 23, 2015).  
Our objective, though, were the things that we did: mobilize our own members, 
mobilize their families and friends, raise political action money, report regularly 
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on where legislators were on this issue, so members would know where 
legislators were and lobby the hell out of them. At church, in the grocery store, 
wherever you see them, jump in their stuff (J. Grant, personal communication, 
July 23, 2015).  
According to Prince, the large public turn out at the regional forums also initiated an at-
home lobbying effort. 
The force of the forums were people would go back home and talk about it. Talk 
about it in their neighborhoods. They’d talk about it in their churches. They’d talk 
about it when they went to PTO meetings. They’d talk about it when they went to 
Rotary meetings. Then their representative shows up at the Rotary meeting, and 
they get to ask questions. They get to ask them (legislators) questions about how 
they feel about the EIA, about education reform (B. Prince, personal 
communication, August 5, 2015). 
Large attendance at the forums “must have kind of shocked them (legislators) when they 
realized how many thousands of people showed up in support of (school reform) and 
were working,” said Conrad Powell. “And not just show up, but were really for it, and 
working for it. It’s got to have an impact” (personal communication, April 7, 2015). 
 Although it was an election year, legislators “are astute enough to put their finger 
to the wind and feel what’s happening,” said Prince. “Plus, in terms of support of what 
they were hearing back home, it was overwhelmingly in support of the package. Not in 
support necessarily of the penny, but we had people hammering away about the package” 
(personal communication, August 5, 2015). 
124 
 
 From the outset, Riley and his staff understood the best chance of passing the EIA 
and the sales tax increase was “to build public support that ultimately would translate into 
legislative support” (D. Drake and B. Prince, personal communication, July 25, 1983).  
No one factor in the year-long EIA campaign tipped the legislative balance in favor of the 
school reform plan. Instead, it was the constant interaction between the “grass top” 
stakeholders and their grassroots counterparts that rallied public action for passage of the 
education improvement legislation. 
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CHAPTER 5 
IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
From all outward appearances, the effort to pass the Education Improvement Act and 
sales tax increase had all the trappings of a political campaign: a catchy slogan, paid TV 
ads, lapel stickers, fly-around press conferences, statewide televised speeches, and 
massive earned media coverage. However, the initiative was less about the glitz of rallies 
and sign-waving advocates, and more about the practical construction of a grassroots 
citizen movement.  
5.1 Discussion of Findings 
“Grassroots” is an often-heard organizational description that belies the difficulty in 
constructing one. Public activism doesn’t spring up from the ground without cultivation. 
Instead, a citizen social movement is developmental, moving from one logical step to the 
next until the group feels empowered enough to stand up on its own (Rocha, 1997).  
In the aftermath of A Nation At Risk, the need for education improvement was at the 
center of a national discussion. With many legislatures across the South opposed to more 
money for schools, southern governors mobilized the public to support increased funding 
by linking better education to better jobs (Gitterman, 2011, p. 38).  
In a study of nationwide education reform, Chance (1986) stated that Riley’s 
grassroots approach to improving education was different from any other state’s reform 
effort. While Riley borrowed William Winter’s idea of public forums to generate support   
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for school reform, he took this concept a step further by building a sense of citizen 
ownership from the beginning of the EIA effort. 
According to Rocha (1997), there are four steps on the citizen empowerment ladder. 
First is when the individual gains a feeling of power by associating with another, such as 
a charismatic leader; second, is the development of self-confidence; third, self-confidence 
grows into feelings of assertion, and fourth, the citizen gains “strength from 
serving/influencing others” and a feeling of “moralized action” (Rocha, 1997, p. 33). 
These steps to citizen empowerment have direct parallels to the EIA initiative to build 
grassroots support.  
When Riley made school reform the sole focus of his office, he shared the power of 
the governorship with public education’s natural constituency, teachers and parents. 
Paulo Freire (1970) wrote that the route to human agency -- or action -- is the sharing of  
power between leaders and participants. It is through a dialogue between a leader and 
participants that all become “jointly responsible for a process in which they all grow” 
(Freire, 1970, p. 80).  This assertion supports findings by the Federal Election 
Commission that many people vote simply because “they were asked to vote by a 
candidate, political party, or a friend” (Stein, Leighly & Owens, 2005, p. 6). Therefore, 
the sharing of power between Riley and grassroots education supporters encouraged 
public engagement in the political process.  
However, Gaventa and Barrett (2010) stated that citizens engagement in social 
movements “do not arise automatically, but need intermediary measures” (p. 59). In their 
study of citizen movements in 20 countries, Gaventa and Barrett (2010) found 
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Successful outcomes are not a straight line but linked through organizing skills 
and thickness of civic networks. As individuals grow in their sense of self efficacy 
and engagement, they benefit from a thickening of alliances and relationships that 
in turn encourage greater participation (p. 30). 
From the outset, the EIA’s strategies were specifically aimed at developing feelings 
of assertion and “moralized action” among supporters that were necessary to build 
grassroots activism (Rocha, 1997, p. 33). The first empowerment step was reached when 
Riley committed his sole attention to building support for the EIA. Developing 
supporters’ self-confidence was accomplished through the regional forums and 
community small group sessions. The forums’ large public turnout generated the sense of 
togetherness or “thickening of alliances” that led to even greater citizen participation 
(Gaventa and Barrett, 2010, p. 30).  
Research indicates that frequent political discussions and the influence of groups are 
important to voter participation. Abrams, Iverson and Soskice (2005) found that the best 
predictor of voting behavior is “interpersonal discussion networks,” made up of family, 
friends, coworkers, and social groups (p. 2). The more frequent the political discussions, 
the more likely it is the participants will vote. The incentive to vote “depends on the 
strength of collective organizations, such as parties, unions, and churches” (Abrams, 
Iverson & Soskice, 2005, p. 10).  
Pippa Norris (2002) found similar results in her study of political action theory. 
People are motivated to engage in political causes according to their personal 
characteristics and their social connections, such as family, co-workers, and neighbors, 
according to Norris. Also, political motivation is an affective response to a cause that will 
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benefit the individual, such as linking education improvement to economic development. 
Therefore, it is a combination of civic networks and organizations, political discussions, 
and an affective response to a beneficial cause that can generate personal political action. 
Achieving what Rocha termed the “Socio-Political” level of citizen engagement was 
essential to passing the EIA . When reaching that level, citizens have gained the power 
and confidence necessary to engage in political action, such as lobbying and voting to 
influence legislative responsiveness (Rocha, 1997, p. 37). 
Recommendations to improve South Carolina’s public schools were not the obstacle 
to legislative approval of the EIA. With the exception of teacher pay, most lawmakers 
agreed with the bill’s proposed reforms. Instead, opposition centered on the one cent 
sales tax increase to permanently fund the plan. Up for reelection, most legislators 
immediately rejected the tax increase. With the November elections ahead, the power of 
mobilized supporters was critical to pressuring the General Assembly to pass the EIA tax. 
Therefore, essential to passage of the EIA was implementing a strategy to develop citizen 
empowerment, build local and statewide civic networks, and create a sense of ownership 
in supporters that would result in an active grassroots movement.  
Data from this case study supported this strategy. Among the findings were that the 
three most effective ways to galvanize grassroots voter support were the citizen 
discussion networks, inclusion of education stakeholders in developing the reform plan, 
and Riley’s use of his gubernatorial stature. 
5.1.1 Citizen discussion networks 
As previously described, numerous studies have shown that the influence of others – 
family, friends, and social groups -- inspire political interest and voter activism. These 
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“interpersonal discussion networks” can increase the frequency of political discussions, 
which in turn increase the likelihood of voting (Abrams, Iverson & Soskice, 2005).   
Riley developed a number of “interpersonal discussion networks” unique to the EIA. 
These discussions served to encourage citizen support and to educate potential voters to 
the personal benefits of the EIA, thereby enhancing the potential for “correct voting” 
(Lau, Andersen &  Redlawsk, 2008). Primary among them were the forums’ small group 
discussion sessions. 
Based on community action research and extensive field testing, Winecoff and Powell 
structured the forums’ small group discussions both to foster a sense of self-efficacy 
among participants and to build a discussion network through group exchanges of ideas 
and suggestions. It is estimated that between 900 to 1,500 people stayed for the small 
group discussions after each reform. Divided into groups of ten, these discussions gave 
participants a chance to learn more about the school reform proposal, as well as an 
important opportunity to consider ideas face-to-face with other community members.  
In her research on political action, Norris (2002) noted the importance of providing 
“the kind of face-to-face networking needed to inspire social trust leading to sustained 
citizen activism” (p.3). The forums’ large public turnout also generated the sense of 
togetherness that Rocha (1997) stated was an important rung on the ladder to citizen 
empowerment (p. 33). In addition to the forum small group discussions, lobbying efforts 
in legislators’ home districts were another example of the power of face-to-face 
networking described by Norris. 
The findings of this case study suggested that home district lobbying by citizens had a 
significant impact. Discussions of school reform among family and friends, in church 
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congregations, and at community social clubs, provided the basis for successful local 
lobbying. The at-home lobbying effort allowed one-on-one dialogues or small group 
exchanges between local EIA supporters and their district legislators. As the SCEA 
lobbyist said, home lobbying got legislators out of their Statehouse empowerment zone 
and into the sphere of their local constituents, who could affect the outcome of November 
legislative elections (J. Grant, personal communication, July 23, 2015).  
Constructing the EIA’s statewide communication network was another manifestation 
of Abrams, Iverson and Soskice’s (2005) interpersonal discussion groups. Although not 
face-to-face, the EIA’s unique communication network was an amalgamation of teacher, 
parent, civic groups, and community organizations throughout the state, united in an 
effort to sustain pressure on the General Assembly. This tight-knit alliance of grassroots 
supporters organized activities, such as the EIA hotline, letter writing and telephone 
campaigns, and the distribution of specific EIA legislative information to parent and 
community organizations. Also included in the EIA communication network were 
participants from the forums’ small group sessions, who asked to be contacted. 
Including all stakeholders from the beginning was fundamental to constructing 
Riley’s “grass tops/grassroots” organization strategy. While the grassroots stimulated 
citizen lobbying, the “grass tops” represented groups who could influence and energize 
their member networks at the grassroots. Although Riley had natural allies for school 
reform among educators, he could not assume they would automatically buy-in to any 
school improvement plan. It was critical from the outset that teachers were included as 
important stakeholders in the EIA’s development. Inclusion would result in ownership, 
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and Riley needed the membership numbers of the teachers’ associations and their well-
established statewide communication organization to reach reluctant legislators. 
5.1.2 Including teachers as policy stakeholders 
In national studies, researchers have found teachers to feel “out of the loop” in the 
formulation of education policy (Billup, A., 2001, March 26). A 2001 report from Public 
Agenda concluded that most teachers were not part of school policymaking, and many 
teachers felt that policymakers were not interested in their input. The study labeled 
teachers a “neglected constituency” that felt “buffeted by forces beyond their control” 
and “decisions are taken without their input” (Farkas, Foley & Duffett, 2001, p. 18). A 
2009 national survey, funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, also concluded 
that teacher opinions were overlooked in the development of school policy (Sawchuk, 
2010).   
I began this case study on the premise that in 1984 there was no strong statewide 
structure on which Riley could build his engagement strategy. As researcher, I assumed 
that South Carolina teachers were a “neglected constituency” that could have little impact 
on the 1984 EIA initiative.  I based my assumptions on personal observations of current 
teacher political disengagement in South Carolina, despite recent policy debates on such 
controversial issues as teacher report cards and pay for performance.  
My assumptions appeared to be verified by a 2009 study that concluded less than half 
the state’s certified teachers voted in the 2006 statewide election, and a third could not 
vote because they were not registered. However, in the course of this case study, I found 
that the climate for teacher inclusion and activism in 1984 was much stronger than I 
originally presumed. In fact, teacher inclusion and activism supplied a strong foundation 
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for Riley’s public engagement initiative. Educators also provided the numbers to provide 
a formidable lobbying group. 
Like today, South Carolina’s public school teachers did not have the clout of 
collective bargaining in 1984. However, they did have a well-established teacher 
association with a history of political involvement. The SCEA not only had a strong 
statewide organizational structure, but with 20,000 members, it was the largest education 
group in the state. 
The SCEA’s organization became the foundation of the EIA’s communication 
network. The teacher association provided an efficient information link from its state 
offices to local school representatives. Its established communication “tree” allowed the 
quick distribution of legislative information. Other education groups, such as the 
Parent/Teacher Associations or the School Improvement Councils, had local visibility 
and community contacts, but they did not have the communication efficiency of the 
SCEA. 
Also, the SCEA embraced political engagement. It maintained lobbyists at the 
Statehouse, encouraged members to become actively involved in education issues, 
endorsed candidates, and donated to political causes. Although the newly formed PSTA 
had members in most school districts, it did not sanction political activity by its teachers 
nor did it have the SCEA’s membership numbers. 
Therefore, the SCEA’s political activism was most important to the EIA’s Statehouse 
lobbying effort.  Its members became the core of the intiative. This is not to imply that 
other education groups did not engage in lobbying activities. PTA membership increased 
by 11,000 members during the 1983-1984 school year. The SCPTA chairman said the 
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organization’s statewide membership grew to 122,000, due to its support of the EIA and 
increased public exposure (Associated Press, 1984, May 13). However, SCEA teachers, 
wearing their copper EIA penny stickers, were the most visible group of supporters in the 
Statehouse lobby. 
In her research on political action, Norris (2002) spoke of the importance of 
mobilizing agencies to build and sustain citizens’ political engagement. “Many cultural 
attitudes and values may shape activism, including the sense that the citizen can affect the 
policy process and political interest, as well as a general orientation of support from the 
political system” Norris wrote (2002, p. 8). While mobilizing associations are important 
to political efficacy, Norris (2002) stated that personal motivation is a key factor in civic 
activism. Thus, including teacher representatives as important “grass tops” stakeholders 
became critical to the EIA’s lobbying success. However, as explained in the case study 
findings, this inclusion was not always smooth.  
A direct personal benefit for teachers was the EIA’s salary increase. With the average 
teacher salary at $16,428 – 48th in the country -- raising teacher salaries to the $17,715 
Southeastern average was a priority for educators. The proposed pay raises constituted 
40% of the $210 million school reform plan; therefore, pressuring the General Assembly 
to support the sales tax increase was essential (Arnold, 1983, July 28). 
Despite the desire for improved salaries, teacher representatives argued among 
themselves and with Riley over the pay raises. During task force meetings, the SCEA 
insisted that teacher pay raises equal the national average.  It was only through Riley’s 
personal intervention that the SCEA agreed to the Southeastern average, thus preserving 
their lobbying power on behalf of the EIA. 
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5.1.3 Growing grassroots empowerment 
The power of the governorship and Riley’s personal persuasion was the third 
component of building and sustaining the “grass tops/ grassroots” coalition. At the grass 
tops, business supporters had influence, and educators, particularly the SCEA, were 
experienced lobbyists. However, building the confidence of grassroots supporters to use 
their voting power to influence legislators was fundamental to the EIA’s success. 
Riley’s grassroots strategy was unique in the national school reform movement. It 
also was unprecedented in South Carolina policymaking. Riley’s call for public 
involvement through the EIA forums, the paid public service ads, and the statewide 
television address was extraordinary. While polling indicated public support for the EIA, 
it also indicated that people were uncertain about how to exert political pressure. 
Paulo Freire (1970) wrote that the route to human agency is the sharing of power 
between leaders and participants. It is through a dialogue between the leader and 
participants that all become “jointly responsible for a process in which they all grow” (p. 
80). Consequently, it was Riley who shared the power of his office to build the self-
confidence and sense of togetherness that his supporters would need to assert themselves 
into the legislative arena. 
According to Rocha (1997), the first rung on the citizen empowerment ladder is the 
sense of power gained through association with a charismatic leader. This first step was 
taken when Riley gave his sole attention to building public support for the EIA. As 
governor, Riley built a sense of shared power and joint responsibility with EIA 
supporters. As the confidence of supporters grew, so did their involvement, until the 
movement reached the benchmark of collaborative political activism (Rocha, 1997, p. 
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38). Rocha (1997) observed that “although the individual is the ultimate receptor of 
benefits, political power is the goal, and political process the means” (p. 40).  Therefore, 
by building a ladder to citizen empowerment, Riley succeeded in mobilizing a grassroots 
movement that brought pressure on the Legislature to approve the EIA and its tax 
increase. 
 5.1.4 Women in policymaking 
Overall, women were the largest cadre of EIA supporters. This was true at the 
Statehouse, as well as at the regional forums. It is estimated over 70% of the forum 
participants were women. In addition to the SCEA, women dominated the SICs and 
PTAs across the state. By extension, it can be assumed that women also spearheaded at-
home lobbying, which proved to be an effective method of influencing legislators. 
In political circumstances like the EIA initiative, feminist theory points to one reason 
why women can become aggressive advocates in a political environment dominated by 
men. Primarily, it is because public education is considered a maternal policy issue. 
According to McDonagh (2009), maternal policies are those which emphasize care and 
concern for society’s individuals. These are education, health care, assistance for the 
needy, among others. When a government adopts maternal policies, it reinforces 
women’s place and value in the policy making sphere. This was particularly true for 
women lobbying for the EIA. 
Since the late 1970s, public education funding or improvement were not priority 
issues for the S.C. Legislature. Even though South Carolina ranked among the bottom 
five states in per student funding, teacher salaries, student academic achievement, and 
high school completion rates, this did not motivate the General Assembly to act. Even 
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increased school funding and teacher salaries in other southern states did not influence 
the Legislature to make education a priority. 
Maternal public policy is “crucial” to public acceptance of women as political 
leaders, according to McDonagh (2009, p. 81). While the Legislature had few women as 
role models for political activism, the SCEA’s stance toward political involvement 
overcame that deficit during the EIA debate. The teacher association had the numbers and 
the organizational structure to recruit and train women as lobbyists, inspire grassroots 
advocacy among other support groups, as well as encourage at-home lobbying among 
friends and family. 
While Riley and other male statewide political were the public face of the EIA, there 
is little doubt that women were the face of its most vocal advocates. According to 
McDonagh (2009), a feminist theorist, the visibility of women in policy making and the 
corresponding impact of maternal social policies extend to voter attitudes toward 
government and increase the likelihood that citizens will vote (p. 99). It can be argued 
that vigorous female advocacy at the Statehouse and in legislators’ home districts made a 
major contribution to the citizen activism needed to pass the EIA. The women advocates 
represented votes, and votes were important to legislators in an election year. 
5.2 Conclusion 
In his examination of school reform in the 1980s, Chance (1986) wrote that South 
Carolina’s school improvement plan “is widely regarded as the one of the most 
cooperatively developed programs in the nation” (p. 48). Unlike the other six states 
examined, Chance wrote, “Because of its many visible points of entry, the South Carolina 
process is widely described as a ‘bottom-up’ model,’” resulting in a “high level of public 
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support” (p. 48). According to Chance (1986), the evolution of the EIA reform legislation 
was less the product of carefully preconceived models than evolving concepts.  
A great deal of emphasis was placed on community forums presided over by 
prominent political figures. This emphasis on public participation, ‘grassroots’ 
involvement, appears to underlie the frequent use of the ‘bottom up’ appellation 
in that state (p. 53). 
Chance’s assessment of a “bottom up” strategy is correct, considering grassroots voters 
were essential to legislative approval of a tax increase in an election year. However, his 
conclusion that the EIA effort was more evolving than carefully planned is contrary to the 
findings of this case study. 
In the July 1983 staff memo to Riley, a specific plan was outlined and strictly 
followed during the effort to win legislative approval of the EIA. Although likened to a 
political campaign, the EIA strategy mirrored theories advanced by political action 
research and citizen empowerment and engagement studies. EIA strategies guided 
supporters through the steps to empowerment until they reached Rocha’s Socio-Political 
level, the benchmark for political activism and described as “transformative populism” 
(1997, p. 37).  
 Public engagement was carefully cultivated by making Riley highly visible during 
the regional forums and the Education Day school tours. Citizen buy-in was 
accomplished through the community small group sessions. Not only were the sessions 
organized so that participants felt free to voice opposition to the plan, but also to make 
suggestions for changes. Summaries of group recommendations were given to the 
participants and the media, adding validity to the importance placed on citizen input. 
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Paid advertising was produced to “teach” citizens how to lobby legislators, and a unique 
communication network was designed to keep supporters informed and to sustain 
grassroots participation through the legislative session. 
What could not be planned is how actively the public would become involved. 
The affective nature of legislation to improve the schools of South Carolina’s children 
certainly was a personal motivating factor for many families and educators, reinforced by 
the state’s rock bottom national rankings. Salary increases also added to teacher 
motivation. 
 The low political status of women, who comprised the majority of its supporters, 
could have been a hindrance; however, this challenge was overcome by the established 
organization of the SCEA, the majority female association that encouraged political 
involvement. The SCEA served as a model for other groups to approach their legislators. 
This was particularly true of the influential at-home lobbying of legislators by neighbors, 
family members, church congregations, and community groups. 
 Riley’s ability to hold together the diverse group of stakeholders also constructed 
and perpetuated activism. Described as a low-key leader who preferred an inclusionary 
approach to policy making, rather than grandstanding and division, Riley gained the trust 
of educators, the business community, and the public by giving all stakeholders a voice 
from the outset. 
 It is impossible to guess whether passage of the EIA and penny sales tax increase 
could have occurred at another time. Certainly, the initiative came during a period when 
the nation feared it was falling behind other countries due to failing schools and failing 
students. This placed school reform on the national radar. Believing that good education 
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was linked to good jobs, southern governors had begun their efforts to drag up their states 
from the bottom of income and school national rankings even before A Nation At Risk 
was published. However, this confluence of events allowed South Carolina the 
opportunity to enact comprehensive school reform and better education funding, an 
initiative that has not been repeated, or attempted, since 1984.    
5.3 Future Research 
This case study examined how the public and South Carolina teachers influenced 
the development and enactment of major school reform and funding legislation. Left 
unanswered is why the same degree of activism is not present today. 
Many say the EIA and tax increase would not have passed without vigorous 
educator lobbying and the implied threat to the re-election of legislators who opposed it. 
A 2009 study of public school teacher voting during the 2006 statewide election indicated 
that over 50% of South Carolina’s teachers either chose not to vote in the 2006 elections 
or could not vote because they were not registered (http://www.risesc.org/). The 2006 
election was significant since it involved elections for governor, state education 
superintendent, and candidates for both the S.C. House of Representatives and state 
Senate. 
The SCEA and PSTA still employ Statehouse  lobbyists, but the combined 
number of teachers belonging to the two association has declined over the last 30 years. 
Current data show that less than 40% of the state’s certified teachers belong to either 
organization. With low voting participation and no statewide organizational structure to 
make their voices heard at the Statehouse, the education community in the Palmetto State 
appears to be largely disengaged from state policy making. Consequently, educators seem 
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silent or passive when it comes to even controversial legislative proposals that would 
affect their classrooms, school funding, and accountability measures. 
Certainly contributing to this silence is the lack of statewide education leadership, 
which political activism and public engagement research indicate are critical to citizen 
empowerment. For over ten years, South Carolina’s governors have not placed public 
schools among their priorities. Public education often is not listed among the 
recommendations promoted during the governor’s annual State of the State address to the 
General Assembly. Gubernatorial actions also have undermined education funding 
through active promotion of public funding for private school vouchers and the vetoing 
of education appropriations in the state budget. 
At the very least, the climate for public education in South Carolina has changed 
dramatically. This may be due to the state’s growing political conservativism or the rise 
of Libertarian-leaning politics. The impact of federal top-down legislation, such as the 
2001 No Child Left Behind Act, which enacted strict test score accountability, or the 
2009 Race To The Top program, which advocates teacher pay based on student 
standardized test scores, may also contribute to teacher disengagement. However, no 
matter the cause or causes, South Carolina’s educators are disengaged.  
In light of the important difference that teacher voices made in the grassroots 
movement to pass the EIA, exploring teacher policy disengagement in South Carolina is 
an important topic for future research. 
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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND CODING SCHEMA 
Specific interview questions: 
1) How were you or your organization involved in the strategy to build support for 
passage of the 1984 S.C. Education Improvement Act? 
2) What strategies did you or your organization employ to build educator, 
legislative, business, and citizen support for passage of the legislation? 
3) What obstacles did you or your organization encounter when organizing and 
implementing this support effort? 
4) In your opinion, what was the most effective strategy used to win legislative 
approval? 
5) In your opinion, what was the impact of citizen engagement on passage of the 
legislation? 
 
Broad-based topics from interview questions  Codes and coding colors 
 Initial strategies     1. Initial 
 Organizing strategies    2. Organizing 
 Engaging citizen support     3. Engagement 
 Sustaining engagement     4. Sustaining 
 Obstacles encountered    5. Obstacles 
 Most effective strategy    6. Most Effective 
 Impact of citizen engagement   7. Citizen Impact 
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APPENDIX B – DATA ANALYSIS CODED TRANSCRIPT IMAGE 
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APPENDIX C – DATA ANALYSIS SPREADSHEET IMAGE 
 
 
